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A PUBLIC OPTION FOR EMPLOYER HEALTH PLANS 
 
Allison K. Hoffman, Howell E. Jackson, and Amy B. Monahan* 
 
Abstract 
Following the 2020 presidential election, health care reform discussions have 
centered on two competing proposals: Medicare for All and an individual public 
option (“Medicare for all who want it”). Interestingly, these two proposals take 
starkly different approaches to employer-provided health coverage, long the 
bedrock of the U.S. health care system and the stumbling block to many prior reform 
efforts. Medicare for All abolishes employer-provided coverage, while an individual 
public option leaves it untouched. 
This Article proposes a novel solution that finds a middle ground between these 
two extremes: an employer public option. In contrast to the more familiar public 
option proposal, which would offer government sponsored health insurance directly 
to individuals, our plan creates a public option for employers, who can select a 
public plan—based on Medicare and altered to meet the needs of working 
populations—instead of a private health plan for their employees.  Employer-based 
private health coverage is in decline and increasingly leaves workers vulnerable.  
Our proposal offers a gradual way to loosen reliance on this system. 
We review the policy, regulatory, fiscal, and business arguments in favor of this 
form of public option, which we argue is less disruptive than Medicare for All but 
more impactful than an individual public option. Because employer take up would 
be gradual and voluntary, our plan has lower fiscal costs and should face less 
resistance from employees and vested interests than Medicare for All. Over time, if 
the plan meets employers’ and employees’ needs, more people would be covered by 
a public option, moving away from over-reliance on private employer plans and 
toward something akin to Medicare-for-Many in a less politically, legally, and 
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When it comes to health policy, two opposing truths are evident. Fundamental 
change is needed and fundamental change is impossible. The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) addressed some major gaps in how Americans pay for 
health care. Perhaps its biggest accomplishment was to expand the Medicaid 
program, which provides medical care for lower-income individuals and families. 
The ACA’s efforts to reform the private market, while remarkable politically, have 
had less impact. The ACA did little to lay the groundwork in the United States for 
the longer-term structures needed to pay for universal health care efficiently and 
equitably. 
What this Article sets out to do is to build on existing policy ideas to offer a 
foundation for more productive and fundamental change in American health care 
financing while being cautious not to proceed at a pace or in a direction that is 
fiscally irresponsible, politically fraught, or simply impractical. We propose that 
employers be given the opportunity to provide health insurance coverage for their 
employees through a Medicare-based public health insurance option. Our proposal 
will disappoint those who would like to see a swift move to Medicare for All. 
Likewise, it entails more change than preferred by those who are used to, or profiting 
from, the current system. In other words, what we propose is probably not anyone’s 
first choice. Yet, it offers transformative potential while avoiding unnecessary 
disruption, and the possibility of a consensus path forward on health care reform.  
The 2020 Democratic primaries featured two major health policy reform ideas. 
Neither was universally satisfying and the contrast between the two proved divisive. 
Intriguingly, the two individuals who each represented one of these ideas are now 
President and Vice President of the United States.  
The first idea was Medicare for All (MFA), endorsed by Vice President Kamala 
Harris, as well as Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren. If designing from scratch 
today, this option that is closer to what exists in peer nations would most certainly 
produce a lower cost system with higher outcomes.1 Yet, in moving towards a 
universal public program from today’s status quo, MFA would inevitably dislocate 
people from familiar employer-sponsored health plans to which they are loyal, 
whether deservedly or not.  MFA was accordingly demonized as antithetical to 
individual autonomy and free choice. It raised the specter of government overreach 
and evoked uncomfortable memories of President Obama’s much repeated 
assurance that under the ACA people who like their health care could keep it.2   
The price tag for MFA proved to be an equally substantial impediment. The cost 
of operating a fully implemented MFA program was estimated to run into the 
 
1 Roosa Tikkanen & Melinda K. Abrams, U.S. Health Care from a Global Perspective, 2019: Higher 
Spending, Worse Outcomes?, Commonwealth Fund Issue Brief (Jan. 30, 2020), 
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2020/jan/us-health-care-global-perspective-2019 
(“The U.S. spends more on health care as a share of the economy — nearly twice as much as the average OECD 
country — yet has the lowest life expectancy and highest suicide rates among the 11 nations.”). 
2 See Angie Drobnic Holan, Lie of the Year: ‘If You Like Your Health Care Plan, You Can Keep It,’ 
POLITIFACT.COM (Dec. 12, 2013), https://www.politifact.com/article/2013/dec/12/lie-year-if-you-like-your-health-
care-plan-keep-it/.  
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trillions of dollars, necessitating a substantial increase in federal taxes.  To be sure, 
comparative evidence suggests that a well-managed public health care financing 
system would reduce the overall health care spending in the United States.3 
Moreover, standard labor economics predicts that universal coverage could help 
workers by reducing the share of their compensation consumed by ever rising health 
care spending.4 These defenses of MFA are, however, complicated and depend upon 
assumptions about market adjustments and economies of scale that are difficult to 
convey in academic seminars, much less presidential debates or twitter feeds.  For 
many, the specter of higher taxes for MFA drowned out all else.  
The second major health policy idea was incremental expansion, building on the 
successes of the ACA. This was the approach embraced by President Joe Biden, 
unsurprisingly in light of the role he played as Vice President when the ACA was 
signed into law. Although the details differed among candidates, the defining feature 
of most incremental reform plans was a public option based on Medicare. Mayor 
Pete Buttigieg aptly coined it “Medicare for all who want it.”5  This approach leaves 
employer-based health plans largely untouched, while increasing offerings in the 
individual market. These public option proposals were targeted narrowly at the 
population most in need of coverage – the uninsured who are not offered employer-
based coverage, who are ineligible for Medicaid, and who had not purchased 
coverage in the ACA’s reformed individual marketplaces. Most simply, the idea was 
that a public option, based on Medicare, would be added into those marketplaces 
and would compete with private plans already offered. In contrast to MFA, the main 
selling points were, first, that this approach retains a high degree of individual 
autonomy and, second, it massively reduced the fiscal costs to the federal 
government as compared to MFA proposals. Importantly, it also left the entrenched 
employer-based system untouched. 
Yet, on the flipside, creating a public option for individuals would reach only a 
tiny fraction of the population.6 This incremental building would not address 
structural problems in the system. It is a layer of plaster spread gingerly across a 
crumbling wall. Even though some public option proposals engage to a limited 
degree with employer-sponsored plans, none of the major versions advanced in the 
Democratic primaries envisioned any significant movement away from our reliance 
on traditional employer-provided health plans and toward a more streamlined 
healthcare financing system. 
It is this feature of current public option proposals that motivated us to ask 
whether we can do better. Health policy experts in the U.S. have long lamented the 
 
3 Tikkanen & Abrams, supra note 1. 
4  See, e.g., Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 177 
(discussing the fungibility of compensation in cash and via benefits). 
5 Scott Simon & Heidi Glenn, ‘Just The Right Policy’: Pete Buttigieg ‘Medicare For All Who Want It’ Plan, 
NPR Morning Edition (Nov. 8, 2019) (interview with Pete Buttigieg regarding his health plan proposal during the 
2019-2020 Democratic primaries).  
6 According to a review of the most prominent health care reforms of democratic presidential candidates 
updated in February 2020, the Biden public option proposal would have expanded coverage by only 15 to 20 million. 
See Primary Care: Estimating Democratic Candidates’ Health Care Plans, COMMITTEE FOR A RESPONSIBLE 
FEDERAL BUDGET, (Feb. 26, 2020), http://www.crfb.org/papers/primary-care-estimating-democratic-candidates-
health-plans. 
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centrality of employer-sponsored health insurance as an accident of history that has 
become increasingly engrained over time, due to its favorable treatment by the tax 
code and a series of other policy decisions.7   
Although having a connection between the workplace and health care is no 
global anomaly, the American way of tying health benefits to a job is unique and 
does not work well for many people, increasingly so as the gig economy grows.  
Employer-sponsored health insurance coverage has become less generous over time, 
leaving households vulnerable to unmanageable health care expenses, especially as 
this coverage comprises an increasing share of workers’ total compensation.8 And it 
has become a major stumbling block—we think the primary stumbling block—to 
more productive structural change, which is starkly needed now more than ever.  
The United States has the most expensive, inefficient, and inequitable health 
care system among its OECD peer nations.9 We spend twice  as much as the average 
OECD nation and get worse outcomes than most on critical metrics, like life 
expectancy, chronic disease burden, and avoidable death.10 What drives high 
healthcare spending is high prices (we use less care per capita than most other 
countries).11 Prices are high because of a fragmented financing system and 
consolidation among providers, who at this point can all but set their reimbursement 
rates in negotiation with private payers, even the largest ones.12  
The three of us (experts respectively in health law and policy; financial 
regulation, consumer protection, and federal budget policy; and employee benefits 
and tax law and policy) have come to believe that the necessary first step toward 
fixing how we pay for health care in the United States is to shift gradually away 
from a system of private employer-based health insurance. We think the best way to 
do that is to offer employers the opportunity to release themselves from the burden 
of designing and administering health care benefits for their employees through the 
creation of a different kind of public option that presents the opportunity for high-
value coverage at a lower cost than the status quo. 
In this Article, we make the case for a public option designed intentionally and 
primarily for employers as an alternative to private insurance plans for their 
employees.  Employers could choose to enroll their workforce in a public plan, based 
on Medicare, instead of having to design and administer their own private plan.  We 
advocate for focusing first on large employers in order to take advantage of these 
employers’ relative expertise in health insurance and because such employers cover 
a majority of the individuals with employer-based coverage, making it easier to roll 
out and test a new approach.13    
 
7 See Timothy Jost, Access to Health Insurance and Health Benefits in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH 
LAW (I. Glenn Cohen, Allison K. Hoffman, and William M. Sage, eds. 2017). 
8 See Part I.C, infra.  
9 Tikkanen and Abrams, supra note 1. 
10 Id.  
11 Id. (showing lower rates of physician visits, similar hospitalization, but greater use of MRI scans per capita). 
12 See Part II.A, infra.  
13 In 2019, two thirds of private sector employees worked for firms with more than 100 employees with over 
46 % at firms with over 1000 employer and a similar share of ESI coverage provided in these categories of firms. 
These estimates are derived from AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
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If even a handful of large employers chose to participate in a public option, it 
could provide valuable information about the benefits and costs savings possible 
from a national system of health care financing.14  The experience gained through 
this transition – including understanding the number and type of employers that 
choose to opt into the public option – would offer compelling evidence on what 
might be the highest-value way to get employees health insurance, revealed through 
the voluntary, and hopefully educated, choices made by employers with substantial 
expertise in choosing health care plans.   
 If it works, gradually and organically, more employers—large and small—
would opt in, eventually producing a less disjointed and expensive way of paying 
for and providing health care. While our approach would not likely result in 
Medicare for All, it might possibly deliver something like Medicare for Many More 
or Medicare for Most.   
We present in this Article a basic concept for an employer-based public option.  
Arguments in favor are multi-faceted and compelling. Employers offer an efficient 
distribution channel to reach both the presently insured and also some of the 
remaining uninsured.  According to recent estimates, 154.7 million non-elderly 
individuals had employer-sponsored health insurance as compared with 18.5 million 
with individual coverage15 and roughly 29 million uninsured (the remainder of the 
population already has public coverage).16  In other words, three times more people 
have coverage through an employer than the sum of current individual market 
enrollees and the uninsured.  That means an employer public option has greater 
potential scale and, in turn, ability to streamline the overall financing system. It 
would likely also reduce the number of uninsured overall. Recent surveys reveal that 
now, unlike before the ACA, the majority of uninsured people are employed either 
full time or part time.17  Some of these workers are offered workplace coverage that 
they cannot afford and others are not offered it at all. This segment will only grow 
as the gig economy and other forms of precarious work expand.  A public option for 
employers can be tailored to incentivize employers to extend coverage to previously 
excluded workers and can subsidize low-income workers’ share of the costs of 
coverage.  
An employer public option also offers significant fiscal advantages.  Current 
employer and employee contributions for employer-sponsored health insurance can 
 
HUM. SERV., Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (2018), 
https://meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_stats/quick_tables_search.jsp?component=2&subcomponent=
1&year=2018&tableSeries=-1&tableSubSeries=&searchText=&searchMethod=1; see also KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2020 ANNUAL SURVEY (2019), files.kff.org/attachment/Report-Employer-
Health-Benefits-Annual-Survey-2020. [hereinafter KFF Employer Health Benefits 2020]. 
14 For example, if one focuses on just the employees covered by the top ten ESI programs as reported on 
ERISA forms in 2018, covered employees total more than 4.2 million with covered household members no doubt a 
multiple of that number.  The largest reporting plan –Walmart Inc. Associates' Health and Welfare Plan – reports 
over 1.5 million employees covered.  Estimates derived from data downloaded from https://freeerisa.com/ . 
15Health Insurance Coverage of Nonelderly 0-64, THE KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, 
https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/nonelderly-0-
64/?dataView=1&currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc
%22%7D, last visited Dec. 23, 2020. 
16 See Kaiser Family Found., Issue Brief: Key Facts about the Uninsured (Dec. 2019).  
17 See text accompanying notes 101-103, infra. 
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be retained—in whole or part—to finance a significant share of this form of public 
option.  Indeed, if the cost savings of Medicare over private coverage are preserved 
even in part, employers and employees should both come out ahead financially.  
Perhaps even more important, the need for higher taxes to support this transition will 
be dramatically lower than those required under other leading reform proposals, as 
payments made to the Medicare system for this kind of public option would be 
accounted for as a voluntary exchange transaction – technically an offsetting 
government collection – and not a tax and spending program. 
Employers would be free to choose whether or not to participate, as consistent 
with norms of autonomy as is the choice a company faces today when it decides 
whether to ship its goods with the U.S. Postal System as opposed to Federal Express 
or to prioritize employee travel by Amtrak rather than commercial airlines.  
Employers, especially large employers, are comparatively well equipped to evaluate 
the relative value of health plans, while taking into account their employees’ needs 
and preferences.  While a public option is usually touted on the grounds that private 
insurers “need real competition,”18 competition works best when the consumers 
understand their choices.  A mountain of evidence shows that individuals struggle 
to do so when making health insurance decisions.19  Although not perfect, corporate 
human resources departments can better navigate alternatives. 
There are good reasons to believe that many employers, both small and large, 
would choose to participate in a public option, even if there may be some initial 
hurdles to overcome.  In many respects, it is anomalous that hundreds of thousands 
of employers must be in the business of providing and annually updating health 
insurance programs for their employees.  Employers that choose to offer a group 
health plan in the current environment must manage health care costs that outpace 
inflation, and must do so within a highly regulated and complex legal environment.  
The possibility for relief from this financial and regulatory morass would motivate 
some employers to select a public option, so long as their employees were 
guaranteed high-quality coverage.   
No doubt, the political lift will be herculean.  Certain vested interests – most 
obviously providers and private health insurance companies – will resist an initiative 
of this sort intuiting, correctly, that it would mean lower reimbursement rates than 
they currently enjoy from private health plans.  Medical providers, from hospitals to 
doctors to medical device and pharmaceutical companies, who gain great profit off 
the current system will fight against it.  Even labor unions who might support the 
idea on a blank slate could resist it if they saw the effort as threatening the loss of 
bargained-for health benefits. But to the extent that there is political will to make 
progress on national health care reform, which will regardless of the specific policy 
platform see resistance from these same groups, a public option for employers 
should be seriously considered because it could spark more than just marginal 
improvements. 
 
18 Press Release, JoeBiden.com, Biden-Sanders Unity Task Force Recommendations 31 (Aug. 2020), at 
https://joebiden.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/UNITY-TASK-FORCE-RECOMMENDATIONS.pdf 
19 See Part I.C, infra. 
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This Article is organized as follows.  In Part I, we provide a brief overview of 
the U.S. health care finance system and review the leading proposals for health 
reform – Medicare for All and an individual public option. We then provide an 
overview of the current state of employer-provided coverage and its challenges.  In 
Part II, we make the basic case for an employer public option and detail its key 
design features.  We also consider in Part II the likelihood that employers will 
voluntarily choose to participate in such a public option.  In Part III, we focus on the 
fiscal aspects of a public option for employers, comparing it to the widely publicized 
scoring estimates for prominent Medicare for All proposals as well as the more 
limited work that has been done on the budgetary scoring of other public option 
proposals.  As explained in this section, the voluntary nature of a public option for 
employers has a dramatic impact on consequences of this proposal for the federal 
budget and elegantly internalizes the offsetting savings that employers and 
employees would enjoy by moving into the Medicare systems in this manner. We 
also offer in this section a brief analysis of why this kind of reform might be possible 
though a budget reconciliation bill that would only require a simple Senate majority.   
I. BACKGROUND ON U.S. HEALTHCARE FINANCE AND 
LEADING REFORM PROPOSALS 
The United States is unique among nations when it comes to paying for health 
care, and not in a good way. Most OECD countries’ systems for health care 
financing grew up in the early- to mid-20th century as medical care became more 
advanced and expensive.20 In Europe, what emerged were public systems of health 
care finance in two forms, often characterized coarsely as Beveridge and Bismarkian 
systems.21 The Beveridge approach was direct provision of health care by the 
government, as in England, where the government owns hospitals and employs 
medical professionals—aka “socialized medicine.” In Bismarkian systems, or social 
insurance, the government finances health care but the providers can be public or 
private. This is what traditional Medicare is in the United States. Even as countries 
developed variations on these themes, at their core, these systems embraced the idea 
that the government would take a central role in ensuring access to affordable health 
care for the entire population.  
The U.S. charted a wholly different path, leading with private health insurance 
and facilitated by hospitals. As medical care became both more effective and 
expensive, hospitals feared unpaid bills if they relied on patients to pay cash for 
service, or having to confirm the financial solvency of every patient prior to 
providing care.22 In response, first hospitals and later cities created pre-paid health 
care funds, such as the one established by Baylor University Hospital in the 1920s, 
which guaranteed people access to medical care up to a certain level, with pre-
payment.23 These types of hospital service plans spread and eventually evolved into 
Blue Cross. Within a short period, Blue Shield followed, offering a similar a 
 
20 PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 237-240 (1982).  
21 T.R. REID, THE HEALING OF AMERICA, Ch. 2 (2009).  
22 STARR, supra note 20, at 295-96. 
23 Id. at 297-298. 
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structure for monthly prepayment of fees to groups of physicians in turn for 
guaranteed access of outpatient care.24  
Then, in the mid 20th Century, employers grew as a source of health coverage in 
the U.S., coinciding with the moment that many other countries were doubling down 
on the government’s role.25 In the U.S., several public policies fostered the growth 
of employer-based coverage. A commonly-told story is that the trend is due to wage 
controls during the war, prompting employers to compensate with benefits instead 
of cash wages, but the growth in employer health plans was relatively small in this 
period as compared to the years prior and after the war.26 More consistent with the 
timing of a major upsurge in adoption of ESI were a 1945 federal rule that required 
employers to leave wartime health benefits in place, a 1949 federal rule allowing 
unions to bargain collectively for health benefits, and most importantly a 1954 rule 
by the Internal Revenue Service excluding dollars spent on health benefits by 
employers and employees from taxation.27 Because of this tax exemption, employer-
provided health benefits are worth substantially more on an after-tax basis than an 
equivalent amount of cash compensation, creating a strong incentive for employers 
to offer such benefits.  With all of these factors, ESI and the centrality of private 
insurance took hold.  
The tax benefits associated with ESI continue to be an important driver of its 
primacy today, but other factors also contribute.28  Before the ACA, markets for 
individually-purchased health insurance functioned poorly, allowing employers to 
offer their employees a benefit they could not get elsewhere.  Large employers also 
benefit from natural risk pooling and economies of scale that make their 
administrative costs lower than either individual or small group coverage (although 
still higher than Medicare).29   
While the ACA significantly improved the availability and affordability of 
coverage on the individual market, ESI has continued to be the dominant source of 
private coverage. Today, nearly 60% of all nonelderly Americans have insurance 
through an employer,30 with Medicare providing the primary source of coverage for 
the elderly and individuals with disabilities and Medicaid providing the primary 
source of coverage for certain low-income and medically needy individuals. Across 
 
24 Id. Unlike the private health insurance of today, the Blues embraced some of the solidaristic characteristics 
that define systems elsewhere in the world, like charging all members of a community the same rate for membership 
regardless of their personal characteristics or health status.  
25 In England, for example, during WWII the government built health infrastructure to deal with an unmet 
need for medical services and this infrastructure served as the beginning of the National Health Service, established 
at the end of the war. Donald W. Light, Universal Health Care: Lessons From the British Experience, 93 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH 25, 26 (2003). 
26 David Blumenthal, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the United States—Origins and Implications, 
355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 82, 83 (2006). 
27 Id. at 83: see also Jost, supra note 7.  
28 For an overview of the many advantages of ESI, see David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for 
Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 23 (2001). 
29 See text accompanying notes 75-77, infra.  
30 KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE OF THE TOTAL POPULATION, 
https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-
population/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%
7D  (data reported as of 2019).  
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the entire U.S population, 49.6% are covered by ESI, 5.9% by private individual 
market coverage, 19.8% by Medicaid, 14.2% by Medicare, and 1.4% through 
military coverage, with 9.2% remaining uninsured.31  
Hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of proposals have promised to reform the 
dysfunctional health care financing system in the U.S.  Many of these, dating back 
decades, have questioned whether employers should continue to play a fundamental 
role in health coverage.32 We focus below on the two that have been most prominent 
in recent years – Medicare for All and an individual public option, the first of which 
abolishes the employer-based system and the latter of which leaves the employer-
based system untouched. Because we believe that an employer public option 
provides an attractive path forward that avoids either extreme, we conclude this Part 
by focusing on the underappreciated challenges of employer-provided coverage and 
why what is often considered to be the highest-functioning piece of the U.S. health 
care system might be the best place to begin systemic reform. 
A. Medicare for All 
Since its passage in 1965, some believed Medicare would eventually become 
the health insurance program for all Americans.33 Momentum in this direction 
slowed right away with the simultaneous passage of Medicaid, a program that paid 
for the most vulnerable populations—children and pregnant women—and took the 
wind out of the sails of quick additional reforms that might have built on Medicare.34 
Yet, the idea of building on Medicare has reemerged after a period of dormancy 
and in various forms. With Senator Bernie Sanders in 2016 and a longer bench of 
proponents in the 2020 Democratic primaries, including Senators Elizabeth Warren 
and Kamala Harris—the idea of Medicare for All (MFA) gained momentum. Most 
proposals lacked concrete details, but the basic idea was similar. Candidates argued 
to replace the dysfunctional way that we pay for medical care in the United States 
with a more efficient and equitable model available to all, or most, people.  
 Senator Bernie Sanders advanced the “purest” version of this idea, a single-
payer public health insurance program that would cover everyone with automatic 
enrollment. He introduced the plan as a Senate bill35 and as the basis of his health 
policy in his candidacy in the 2016 and 2020 Democratic primaries.36 Following the 
 
31 Id. 
32 See, e.g. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, EMPLOYMENT AND HEALTH BENEFITS: A CONNECTION AT RISK vii 
(Marilyn J. Field & Harold T. Shapiro eds, 1993) (“Unlike most National Research Council committees, however, 
this committee did not reach consensus on some central issues. For example, committee members could not agree 
on whether employment-based health benefits should be continued or abandoned …”). 
33 THEODORE R. MARMOR, POLITICS OF MEDICARE 173 (2d ed., 2000). 
34 Id. at 60. 
35 For most recent version, see Medicare for All Act of 2019, S.1129, 116th Cong., at 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-
bill/1129/text?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22%5C%22medicare+for+all%5C%22%22%5D%7D&r=2&s=
4. The 2019 House version was sponsored by Representative Pramila Jayapal. Medicare for All Act of 2019, 
H.R.1384, 116th Cong., at https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/1384.  
36 Bernie Sanders on Healthcare, FEELTHEBERN.ORG, https://feelthebern.org/bernie-sanders-on-healthcare/ 
[https://perma.cc/TGZ9-QPBV], last visited Mar. 5, 2020 (stating Medicare for all “[c]overs primary and preventive 
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2016, election, more politicians began to follow in Senator Sanders’s footsteps. The 
Medicare for All Act of 2019 included fourteen co-sponsors, including prominent 
members such as Senators Harris, Leahy, Markey, and Warren.37  Notable about 
Senator Sander’s version of Medicare for All are its ideological commitments and 
truly universal and comprehensive nature, which for many made it more symbolic 
than realistic.38 This proposal came with a hefty price tag – with estimates from think 
tanks or academics ranging from about $25 trillion to $35 trillion in increased federal 
government costs or outlays over the ten-year period following a Medicare for All 
enactment.39 Yet, many experts estimated that this plan that would leave no one 
uninsured or underinsured would result in little or no growth in total health care 
spending.40  
As discussed further in Part III, because the federal government would pay a 
large part of the price tag through taxes, the fiscal case proved a major stumbling 
block. Sanders proposed a variety of mechanisms for progressive financing, 
including increased taxes that also provided his opponents fodder for attack.41  
 Notably, several candidates espoused the idea on the 2020 campaign trail 
during the Democratic primaries. One of the more intriguing policy aspects of these 
proposals arose when some candidates, including Senators Sanders, Warren, and 
Harris, introduced “phase-in” plans on how to transition from the current system to 
MFA.42 Perhaps most relevant now are the details—albeit few—of Senator Harris’s 
plan.  
 After strong advocacy for MFA, Senator Harris pulled back slightly and 
acknowledged, rightly, that it is difficult to get from a deeply-embedded employer-
based health insurance system to Medicare for All. Thus, she proposed a ten-year 
transition period, during which people who wanted to buy into Medicare more 
quickly could do so.43 Harris’s transition period included some structural 
 
care, mental health care, reproductive care, vision, hearing and dental care, and prescription drugs, as well as long-
term services for the disabled and elderly.”). 
37 Medicare for All Act of 2019, S.1129, 116th Cong., at https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-
bill/1129/text?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22%5C%22medicare+for+all%5C%22%22%5D%7D&r=2&s=
4.  
38 These commitments included universal coverage; a short four-year transition period after which every 
American would be automatically enrolled; comprehensive benefits that reached well beyond what Medicare covers 
today, including dental and vision benefits, and long-term care; and no cost-sharing at the point of care, erasing the 
deductibles, co-payments, co-insurance, and balance billing that vex and financially strain many Americans. Id. 
39 Choices for Financing Medicare for All, COMMITTEE FOR A RESPONSIBLE FEDERAL BUDGET, 
http://www.crfb.org/papers/choices-financing-medicare-all (last visited June 12, 2020). 
40 See, e.g., Josh Katz et al., Would ‘Medicare for All’ Save Billions or Cost Billions?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 
2019. 
41 How Does Bernie Pay for His Major Plans?, BernieSanders.com, https://berniesanders.com/issues/how-
does-bernie-pay-his-major-plans/ [https://perma.cc/J4BW-ZPX8] (last visited Dec. 23, 2020). 
42 Elizabeth Warren, My First Term Plan for Reducing Health Care Costs in America  and Transitioning to 
Medicare for All, ELIZABETHWARREN.COM,  https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/m4a-transition 
[https://perma.cc/L3LW-W4JJ] (last visited Mar. 5, 2020) (detailing Warren’s plan for transitioning to Medicare 
for All, which included immediate and free coverage for children under age 18 and anyone earning under 200% of 
the federal poverty level). 
43 Kamala Harris, My Plan for Medicare for All, MEDIUM (July 29, 2019), 
https://medium.com/@KamalaHarris/my-plan-for-medicare-for-all-7730370dd421 [https://perma.cc/82EX-
Q84G]. The Sanders’s and Warren transition plans also allowed this individual opt-in. 
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characteristics to lubricate more fundamental long-term transformation, including 
automatically enrolling all newborns and uninsured people into the Medicare 
program.44 Senator Harris stood by the eventual goal of MFA: “At the end of the 
ten-year transition, every American will be a part of this new Medicare system.”45  
 Although what we propose in this Article differs from Senator Harris’s 
transition plan, both recognize that a key to fundamental and necessary change is a 
more gradual shift away from our over reliance on employers as a locus of access to 
health insurance.   
B. Fixing the ACA with an Individual Public Option 
The public option has been described by its proponents as simply one option 
among many, a public health insurance plan that would compete side-by-side with 
private plans. Presumably, if the public option offered a similar or better product for 
lower prices, people would choose it. As Jacob Hacker suggested: “public plan 
choice gives Americans the opportunity to choose for themselves how they value 
the strengths and weaknesses of a public, Medicare-based plan and competing 
private health plans.” 46 
Provoking some of the most heated moments in the primaries were debates 
between the MFA advocates and those candidates who preferred to build 
incrementally on the ACA with a public option. Most, including Vice President Joe 
Biden, still leaned on Medicare for their plans, but only to serve as the foundation 
for the public option to fill in the gaps the ACA left.  Dozens of Congressional 
proposals envision a similar model.   
What most defines the prominent public options plans is who makes the 
selection of the plan—the individual.  These plans are built on individual choice and 
are sold as the epitome of autonomy, as Pete Buttigieg promoted it on the campaign 
trail: “Medicare for all Who Want It.”47  Although the policy details have evolved 
from the initial conversations that took place prior to the passage of the ACA, the 
main contours remain and are similar among different plans.  The public option is 
based on Medicare and is offered in the ACA exchanges, or marketplaces, where an 
individual, or in some cases a small business, could select it.  
The Sanders-Biden Unity Task Force recommendations, which align fairly 
closely with what Vice President Biden proposed on the campaign trail, wrote: 
Private insurers need real competition to ensure they have 
incentive to provide affordable, quality coverage to every American.  
To achieve that objective, we will give all Americans the choice 
to select a high-quality, affordable public option through the 
Affordable Care Act marketplace. The public option will provide at 
least one plan choice without deductibles, will be administered by 
 
44 Id.  
45 Id. 
46 Jacob S. Hacker, Institute for America’s Future, The Case for Public Plan Choice in National Health Reform 
2 (2008). 
47 See Dylan Scott, Pete Buttigieg’s Medicare-for-all-who-want-it plan, explained, Vox.com (Sept. 19, 2019), 
at https://www.vox.com/2019/9/19/20872881/pete-buttigieg-2020-medicare-for-all (last accessed Feb. 15, 2021),  
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the traditional Medicare program, not private companies, and will 
cover all primary care without any copayments and control costs for 
other treatments by negotiating prices with doctors and hospitals, 
just like Medicare does on behalf of older people. The lowest-
income Americans not eligible for Medicaid will be automatically 
enrolled in the public option at no cost to them, although they may 
choose to opt out at any time. Everyone will be eligible to choose 
the public option or another Affordable Care Act marketplace plan, 
even those who currently get insurance through their employers, 
because Democrats believe working people shouldn’t be locked in 
to [sic.] expensive or insufficient health care plans when better 
options are available.48 
This idea would improve the status quo. It would fill gaps left by the ACA, 
especially in those states that have chosen not to expand Medicaid, which perversely 
left some of the poorest people in the states uninsured when others earning just 
pennies more receive generous subsidies to buy private plans.  Plus, in states where 
there are very few private insurers participating on the exchanges, there is evidence 
that a public option might help keep premium prices in check.49 Various pieces of 
proposed legislation have included a similar public option, including eight of ten 
health reform bills proposed in Congress last session.50  
 Yet, the problem with these proposals is that they will almost certainly fail to 
catalyze more fundamental change. It is unlikely that this public option—even in the 
best-case scenario—will reach very many people. As of now, only six percent of the 
non-elderly population (just under 20 million people) have individual market 
coverage.51 If every uninsured person were added to this market, it would grow to 
just under 50 million people.52 By comparison, there are an estimated 156.5 million 
individuals with employment-based coverage,53 and a further 26 million employees 
 
48 Press Release, JoeBiden.com, Biden-Sanders Unity Task Force Recommendations 28 (Aug. 2020), at 
https://joebiden.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/UNITY-TASK-FORCE-RECOMMENDATIONS.pdf. 
49 See Jon R. Gabel et al., Competition and Premium Costs in Single-Insurer Marketplaces: A Study of Five 
Rural States, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, (Mar. 6, 2018), 
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2018/mar/competition-and-premium-costs-single-
insurer-marketplaces-study (showing that decreases in number of insurers in some states marketplaces led to 
relatively faster premium growth). 
50 Choose Medicare Act, S. 1261, H.R. 2463, 116th Cong. (2019); Medicare for America, H.R. 2452, 116th 
Cong. (2019); Medicare-X Choice Act of 2017, S.1970, 115th Cong. (2017); The CHOICE Act, H.R.2085, S.1033, 
116th Cong. (2019) (sponsored by Representative Schakowsky and Senator Whitehouse to create a federal public 
plan option on the ACA marketplaces under existing procedures and rules); Keeping Health Insurance Affordable 
Act, S.3, 116th Cong. (2019) (sponsored by Senator Cardin to create a federal public option on ACA exchanges); 
Medicare at 50 Act, S.470, 116th Cong. (2019) (sponsored by Senator Debbie Stabenow and allows individual age 
50 and older to opt into Medicare early); Medicare Buy-In and Health Care Stabilization Act of 2019, H.R.1346, 
116th Cong. (2019) (sponsored by Representative Higgins to allow individuals age 50 and older to opt into 
Medicare); State Public Option Act, S.489, H.R.1277, 116th Cong. (2019) (co-sponsored by Senator Schatz and 
Representative Lujan to allow a state public option for Medicaid buy in).  
5151 KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 30.  
52 Id. 
53 Matthew Rae, Daniel McDermot, et al., Long-Term Trends in Employer-Based Coverage, PETERSON-KFF, 
HEALTH SYSTEM TRACKER.  
(Apr. 3, 2020) https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/brief/long-term-trends-in-employer-based-coverage/. 
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who either are not offered coverage by their own firms or are offered and decline 
coverage. Even more, these proposals all rely on individuals identifying that the 
public option is better for them than the private plans offered in their state and 
selecting it.  A mountain of evidence makes clear that individuals struggle to figure 
out what health plan is best for them and are resistant to change plans once they 
select them.54 Even those who understand health insurance well struggle to 
differentiate and select among health plans, which should be unsurprising when 
considering the nature of health plan choice.  At the most fundamental level, buying 
health insurance demands having preferences about things that most people have 
never experienced before, like hospitalization or cancer care, and weigh the risk of 
ever needing such care against spending on other goods and services. 
Most people do not understand the basic features of health insurance plans that 
should shape their decisions—such as how much a plan costs, cost-sharing features, 
and what benefits are covered.55  
Furthermore, choosing a health plan requires making calculations regarding 
deductibles, cost-sharing, and premiums that exceed many American’s literacy and 
numeracy skills.56 In the end, there is a volume of empirical work illuminating the 
many ways that and reasons why individuals—regardless of education, income, or 
smarts—make poor choices among health plans.57  
 
54 See Allison K. Hoffman, Health Care’s Market Bureaucracy, 66 UCLA L. REV. 1926, 1953-58 (2019) 
(citing studies showing the many ways in which people make poor health insurance choices, and why); Allison K. 
Hoffman, The ACA’s Choice Problem, 45  J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y, & L. 501, 504-506 (2020) (describing a selection 
of these studies).  
55 Deborah W. Garnick et al., How Well Do Americans Understand their Health Coverage, 12 HEALTH AFF. 
204, 206 (1993) (finding that even though consumers largely understood whether their plans covered hospitalization 
or doctors’ visits, they underreported that their plans covered services including mental health, alcohol and drug 
abuse treatment, or prescription drug and over-reported that their plans covered long-term care). George 
Loewenstein et al., Consumers’ Misunderstanding of Health Insurance, 32 J. HEALTH ECON. 850, 855 (2013) (In a 
survey of insured adults, only 14 percent correctly answered four simple multiple-choice questions about cost-
sharing features like a deductible or copayment.) 
56 Wendy Nelson et al., Clinical Implications of Numeracy: Theory and Practice, 35 ANN. BEHAV. MED. 261 
(2008) (providing an overview of research on health numeracy and the clinical implications for patients); Ellen 
Peters & Irwin P. Levin, Dissecting the Risky-Choice Framing Effect: Numeracy as an Individual-Difference Factor 
in Weighing Risky and Riskless Options, 3 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 435 (2008) (showing that lower levels 
of numeracy led to higher loss aversion). On health insurance literacy specifically, see, e.g., ZSOFIA PARRAGH & 
DEANNA OKRENT, HEALTH LITERACY AND HEALTH INSURANCE LITERACY: DO CONSUMERS KNOW WHAT THEY 
ARE BUYING (Alliance for Health Reform, Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.allhealthpolicy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/Health-Literacy-Toolkit_163.pdf (describing and summarizing studies on health insurance 
literacy).  
57 The many studies showing these problems span different insurance marketplaces that have plan choices, 
including employer, ACA, and Medicare Part D. See, e.g., Eric J. Johnson et al., Can Consumers Make Affordable 
Care Affordable? The Value of Choice Architecture, 8 PLOS ONE e81521. (showing in a simulated ACA model 
even odds that participants who passed a screening test for basic insurance literacy would select the better plan, and 
Wharton business school study participants got it wrong over one-quarter of the time); Anna D. Sinaiko & Richard 
A. Hirth, Consumers, Health Insurance, and Dominated Choices, 30 J. HEALTH ECON 450, 453 (2011) (showing 
among enrollees in the University of Michigan’s employee health plan, over one-third of workers selected a plan 
that was identical to another in every way except that it had a more restricted provider network, a plan known as a 
“dominated” plan because no one should choose such a plan in any circumstance); Jason Abaluck & Jonathan 
Gruber, Heterogeneity in Choice Inconsistencies Among the Elderly: Evidence from Prescription Drug Plan Choice, 
101 AM. ECON. REV. 377, 379 (2011) (finding that 73 percent of Medicare Part D prescription drug program 
enrollees could have chosen a plan with lower premiums with no risk of spending more on prescription drugs over 
the course of the year.); Florian Heiss et al., Plan Selection in Medicare Part D: Evidence from Administrative Data, 
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The bottom line is that public option proposals focused on the individual market 
are unlikely to provide an incremental step towards more coherent and equitable 
health care financing. Competition in the individual health insurance market simply 
does not work as intended or predicted. Even if the public option were an obvious 
best alternative offered on the individual market, individuals would not necessarily 
select it.  In turn, the public option would not exert competitive market pressure that 
some still predict and hope it might. That means that even if the public option were 
widely taken up by currently uninsured individuals, it would reach only a small 
subset of the population, while leaving the larger inequitable and confusing 
patchwork in place.  
C. Employer-Sponsored Coverage as an Attractive Starting Point 
for Reform 
As discussed above, employers currently play a central role in providing health 
insurance, which at first blush makes targeting a public option and reforms at ESI 
seem potentially fraught. It is one of the more stable aspects of a healthcare financing 
system that has many more critical gaps to fix, including the fact that approximately 
ten percent of the population under age sixty-five is still uninsured.58 Yet the 
fragmented employer-based system acts as a real impediment to any type of 
fundamental change to our system of healthcare finance. Without beginning to re-
think employer-provided coverage, it is hard to imagine tackling fundamental issues 
such as cost containment and the provision of universal and equitable coverage.  
There are of course several reasons why employers might prefer to remain at the 
center of the U.S. healthcare system. Large employers generally view health benefits 
as an important part of their strategy to recruit and retain workers, a position that is 
generally supported by employee surveys.59 Some employers see keeping 
employees healthy as enhancing productivity and use health benefits to try to 
maintain a healthy workforce, including wellness programs, gym  membership, and 
health coaching for chronic or serious conditions.60 These factors make the current 
 
32 J. HEALTH ECON 1325, 1377-78 (2013) (estimating that only about 10 percent of Medicare Part D enrollees 
choose the least-expensive plan option); Vicki Fung et al., Nearly One-Third of Enrollees in California’s Individual 
Market Missed Opportunities to Receive Financial Assistance, 36 HEALTH AFF. 21 (2017) (describing that a 
significant share of ACA enrollees choose plans with the lowest monthly premiums but that make them ineligible 
for cost-sharing reductions to help pay for out-of-pocket costs, likely leading to more spending over the year for 
many of them).  When measured more subjectively, people fail to buy plans that align with their own stated 
preferences or needs. See, e.g., Saurabh Bhargava et al., The Costs of Poor Health (Plan Choices) & Prescriptions 
for Reform, 3 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & POL’Y 1, 7-8, 10 (2017) (simulating purchase on ACA exchanges, only one-third 
of respondents chose the cost-minimizing plan, based on their own anticipated medical care need) The authors of 
this study estimated that if all people buying plans on the ACA exchanges had similar error rates as the study 
population, “the result would be roughly $7.1 billion of excess spending each year, borne by a population with low 
to moderate incomes.” Id. at 10.  
58 KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 30. 
59 See, e.g., America’s Health Insurance Plans, The Value of Employer-Provided Coverage (2018) (reporting 
results of employee survey where 71% reported satisfaction with their employer’s health plan. Forty-six percent of 
surveyed employees stated that their employer’s health plan played a role in recruiting them, and 56% reported that 
the health plan has an impact on the employee’s choice to stay in their current job).  
60 See  Jeffrey Pfeffer et al., Employers’ Role in Employee Health: Why They Do What They Do, 62 J. 
OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. e601 (2020). But see Damon Jones et al., What do Workplace Wellness Programs 
do? Evidence from the Illinois Workplace Wellness Study, 134 Q.J. ECON 1747 (2019) (presenting the results of a 
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structure sticky, but not unyielding to change, as we explore in Part II.C addressing 
the many reasons why employers might want change. First, this subpart offers a 
quick landscape of the employer market and its challenges to illuminate why we 
think targeting a public option at that market is necessary. 
1. The Evolving Picture of the Employer Market and Growing Costs 
An estimated 156.5 million nonelderly individuals were enrolled in an employer 
plan in 2018 (58% of the nonelderly population and 49% of the total U.S. 
population).61 Just over half of all private sector firms offer health insurance to some 
workers, but nearly all firms with more than 200 workers do so.62 Seventy percent 
of workers covered by health insurance are employed at large firms.63 This is why 
we think that large employers are a necessary locus for more fundamental, structural 
change.  
Larger firms are more likely to offer better health insurance and to require 
employees to pay a lower share of costs, as compared to smaller firms.  Large firm 
plans tend to have higher total premiums, due to the generosity of benefits, but lower 
employee premium contributions, lower deductibles, lower out-of-pocket 
maximums, and lower copays.64 
Yet, regardless of size of firm, the cost of health benefits for employers has 
skyrocketed over the past two decades, far outpacing wage growth and inflation.65 
The average annual premiums in 2020 were $7,470 for single coverage and $21,342 
for family coverage.66 Employers have been paying more for coverage, with the 
average employer contribution increasing from $1,878 in 1999 to $6,227 in 2020 for 
single coverage and $4,247 to $15,754 for family coverage.67 Employee 
contributions have also increased substantially, with required contributions for 
family coverage increasing 13% over the last five years and 40% over the last ten 
years.68 Today, employees are required to contribute on average 17% of the premium 
for single coverage and 27% of the premium for family coverage.69 Not surprisingly, 
firms with lower-wage workers have less generous benefits and greater worker 
contributions; for family coverage, these firms had an average family premium of 
$19,332 in 2020, with workers contributions of $7,226 (close to 40%). In addition 
to premiums, cost-sharing obligations are also considerable. In 2020, over half of all 
 
randomized controlled trial of a workplace wellness program, which found that such programs neither lower medical 
costs nor improve health outcomes or worker productivity). 
61 Matthew Rae, Daniel McDermot, et al., Long-Term Trends in Employer-Based Coverage, PETERSON-KFF, 
HEALTH SYSTEM TRACKER  
(Apr. 3, 2020) https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/brief/long-term-trends-in-employer-based-coverage/. 
62 KFF Employer Health Benefits 2020, supra note 13, at 45. 
63 Id. at 25, Figure M.6.  
64 Id at 41,  
65 Id. at 40, 42. Figure 1.10, Figure 1.12. 
66 Id. at 7. 
67 Id. at 83-84. 
68 Id. at 96. 
69 Id. at 82. Rates of employer subsidization vary based on firm size, particularly for family coverage. Large 
firms require employees to pay on average 24% of the cost of family coverage, while small firms require employees 
to pay 35% of the cost. Id. 
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covered workers were in plans with an average annual deductible of over $1000.70 
When premiums and cost-sharing obligations are combined, employees on average 
pay 34% of total healthcare costs (20% premiums, 13% all other costs).71  
Although most large employer plans offer a reasonable choice of providers, the 
breadth of choice has diminished over time as employers try to contain costs,72 and 
will almost certainly continue to do so over time since limiting networks is the most 
feasible cost control mechanism under employers’ control. Changes to benefits will 
be more likely to garner objections from employees. Large firm plans generally offer 
several options of plans but they have only small differences among them with 
respect to the treatments and services  covered.73 And employer plans have little 
control over the prices they for items and services, as discussed below. As a result, 
most ESI plans have some limits in the network of providers someone can see, or 
charge more for seeing doctors out of network.74  
The overhead costs for plans vary significantly, although are difficult to estimate 
precisely because of the inconsistent and malleable ways that both private and public 
plans categorize various costs. One study reported that administrative expenses for 
small group health plans accounts for 25-27% of premiums, compared to 5-11% for 
large companies with self-insured health plans.75 Another found that administrative 
expenses average 17% for private insurers.76 In each case, the estimates for 
employer-provided plans tend to be higher than the 2-5% administrative overhead 
for Medicare and Medicaid.77 And it is not clear whether these estimates sufficiently 
account for the in-house resources devoted to health plan administration, as 
discussed below. 
2. The Administrative Costs and Challenges of Employer-Provided 
Health Coverage 
In addition to the significant premium expense of employer-provided health 
plans, there are also less obvious costs and risks associated with such coverage from 
 
70 Id. at 104. 
71 Matthew Rae, Rebecca Copeland & Cynthia Cox, Tracking the Rise in Premium Contributions and Cost-
Sharing for Families With Large Employer Coverage, PETERSON-KFF: HEALTH SYSTEM TRACKER (Aug. 14, 2019) 
https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/brief/tracking-the-rise-in-premium-contributions-and-cost-sharing-for-
families-with-large-employer-coverage/. As for prescription drug costs, the same report found that large employers 
end up paying 88.9% of the cost. Id. 
72 KFF Employer Health Benefits 2020, supra note 13, at 78, Fig. 5.1. 
73 DEP’T OF LABOR, SELECTED MEDICAL BENEFITS: A REPORT FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR TO THE 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 5-36 (2011), 
http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/selmedbensreport.pdf 5-36. 
74 Id. at 77. Forty-seven percent of workers are in PPOs; 31% in HDHP/SOs; 13% in HMOs; 8% in POS plans; 
and 1% in conventional plans. The POS and conventional plans might compete on network, but all others have more 
network restrictions than Medicare does. Of firms with 5000 workers or more, the largest plan for 31% has a tiered 
provider network.  
75 A self-insured plan is one in which the employer retains responsibility for paying claims, often utilizing an 
insurance company only to provide administrative services. 
76 Emily Gee & Topher Spiro, Excess Administrative Costs Burden the U.S. Health Care System, CENTER FOR 
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the employer’s perspective. In particular, offering a group health plan comes with 
significant plan design costs and challenges, compliance costs, and litigation risks.  
It is likely that at least some employers have become accustomed to these obligations 
and now have come to consider them among the costs of doing business. Yet, if 
offered the opportunity to relinquish them, we think many would do so gladly.  
An employer that decides to offer a health plan to employees must begin by 
making various plan design decisions, such as eligibility terms, benefit design, cost-
sharing structure, network breadth, and financing arrangement. For large employers, 
in-house benefits experts typically work with outside benefits consultants to make 
these decisions, while smaller employers may consult only an insurance broker.  
Once these initial decisions are made, the employer must either purchase a group 
insurance policy or hire a third-party administrator (TPA) to administer the plan. 
That purchasing or hiring process is typically done through a request for proposals 
(“RFP”) that solicits bids from interested parties. In fact, it is not unusual for a large 
employer to issue multiple RFPs to cover not only traditional medical benefits, but 
also separate RFPs for the plan’s prescription drug benefit, specialty drug benefit, 
wellness program, COBRA administration, and data warehousing. Once bids are 
received, the employer must select a winner in each category and negotiate the final 
terms of the contracts.  
If the employer wants to allow employees to pay for premiums on a pre-tax basis 
(as all should), the employer must establish a cafeteria plan under section 125 of the 
Internal Revenue Code to allow such contributions. Many employers also choose to 
offer a health care flexible spending account under their cafeteria plan, which allows 
employees to pay out-of-pocket medical expenses on a pre-tax basis, which typically 
requires yet another vendor. 
After the plan has been designed and agreements with vendors are in place, the 
employer must administer an open enrollment process, informing eligible employees 
of their choices and allowing them to make an election within a specified window. 
Plus, they must establish technical processes to actually enroll the employee and 
family members in coverage and ensure the proper payroll deductions and plan 
contributions are made. 
Following open enrollment, the plan must be administered on an ongoing basis. 
While the insurer or a third-party administrator is principally responsible for such 
administration, the tasks involved are significant.  At a minimum, the insurer or TPA 
must process prior authorization requests, claims and appeals, and mid-year changes 
in enrollment.  The insurer or TPA is also responsible for negotiating and 
maintaining a provider network and, as a practical matter, must have a call center 
for both participant and provider inquiries. 
a. Regulatory Burdens 
Once the plan is up and running, employers are faced with myriad legal 
requirements.  The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended 
(ERISA) is the federal statute that governs nearly all employer-provided health 
plans, other than those sponsored by churches or governments.  Although ERISA 
was designed primarily with pension plans in mind, it imposes significant reporting 
and disclosure and claims and appeals procedures on health plans. ERISA also 
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incorporates federal requirements that provide the right for individuals covered by 
an employer health plan to continue their coverage for a specific period of time if 
they have a qualifying loss of coverage (known as “COBRA” continuation 
coverage), as well as various nondiscrimination requirements included in the Health 
Insurance Portability & Accountability Act (HIPAA) and a small number of 
mandated benefits.78  
In addition to ERISA, the federal tax code also regulates employer-provided 
health plans. The tax code contains the so-called employer mandate, which subjects 
large employers to a financial penalty if they fail to offer an affordable group health 
plan.79 The calculation of the credit is complicated, but it generally ranges from 
$2,000 to $3,000 per employee per year. There are regulations establishing when an 
employer is considered to offer a group health plan for these purposes, and when 
and to what extent that coverage is considered affordable for a particular employee.80 
The tax code also incorporates many of ERISA’s substantive group health plan 
requirements and the ACA’s health insurance reforms (such as prohibitions on pre-
existing condition exclusions and lifetime and annual limits) and subjects plans that 
do not comply with such requirements to a $100 per day per affected individual 
excise tax.81 In addition, as mentioned above, in order to allow participants to pay 
premiums on a pre-tax basis, the employer must adopt a cafeteria plan administered 
in accordance with IRS guidance. For example, the cafeteria plan regulations dictate 
when a married employee who is getting a divorce may change their health plan 
election from family coverage to single employee coverage, or drop or add coverage 
altogether. Similarly detailed rules apply to health care flexible spending accounts, 
which may only be offered through a cafeteria plan.  
Employers must also ensure compliance with several other federal laws that 
touch employer health plans, such as HIPAA’s privacy rules, the Americans with 
Disability Act (ADA), and the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). For employees 
who are Medicare-eligible, the employer or plan administrator must navigate 
Medicare Secondary Payer rules, which determine how benefit payments are 
coordinated between the employer plan and Medicare. 
Some employer plans, if financed through an insurance contract rather than self-
insured, are also subject to state laws. Such laws regulate not only the insurance 
company itself (through mechanisms such as capital reserve requirements), but can 
also have an impact on substantive features of the group contract, such as mandated 
benefits or dispute resolution mechanisms. For plans that self-insure but purchase 
stop loss coverage, state law can regulate the stop loss policy. 
 
78 ERISA broadly preempts state laws that relate to employee benefit plans, other than those that regulate 
insurance, which creates an additional level of legal complexity that often results in litigation over what state laws 
are preempted and has produced an encyclopedic number of Supreme Court decisions. See 29 U.S.C. §1144(a). 
79 I.R.C. §4980H. 
80 Treas. Reg. §54.4980H-5. See also David Gamage, Perverse Incentives Arising from the Tax Provisions of 
Healthcare Reform: Why Further Reforms are Needed to Prevent Avoidable Costs to Low- and Moderate-Income 
Workers, 65 TAX L. REV. 669 (2012) (detailing some of the labor market distortions that are likely to result from 
the ACA’s tax provisions). 
81 I.R.C. § 4980D. 
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b. Claims Disputes and Litigation Risks 
In addition to the upfront plan design costs and ongoing compliance costs, 
employers that sponsor a group health plan also face risks related to claims disputes.  
Where a health plan denies a claim, the covered individual has the right to an internal 
appeal that is subject to detailed procedural requirements.  In addition, as part of 
ACA reforms, nearly all employer plans now must offer participants the ability to 
appeal claims that are denied on the basis of clinical or scientific judgment to an 
independent medical expert.  That independent review is conducted de novo, and is 
binding on the plan.  If those appeals are unsuccessful, the covered individual has 
the right to file suit under ERISA to challenge the claim denial.82   
While the financial impact of these claims disputes may be relatively limited,83 
these lawsuits can have a profound impact on the relationship between employer and 
employee.  A dispute between an employer and employee about potentially life or 
death issues can irreparably harm the employment relationship with the affected 
employee and also damage morale within the broader employee community. 
In addition to lawsuits brought by employees, employers that sponsor health 
plans sometimes find themselves as plaintiffs in lawsuits against employees to 
enforce plan reimbursement clauses.  These clauses, common in employer health 
plans, require that covered individuals reimburse the plan for medical expenses if 
the plan paid for medical care and the employee later recovers against a third party 
in an action related to those medical expenses. For example, if an employee is 
injured in a car accident and receives a related settlement or judgment from a third-
party, the health plan has a right to be reimbursed for the amount it spent to provide 
medical care to the employee as a result of the car accident.  As with denied claims 
lawsuits, these reimbursement actions often damage the employer-employee 
relationship and have at times resulted in unfavorable media coverage of the 
employer.84  
All told, designing and maintaining a group health plan is a significant and costly 
undertaking for large employers, over and above actual premium costs.  While those 
efforts generally deliver a valued benefit, a public option that provides high value 




82 While claims that proceed to litigation pose relatively low financial risk, independent external review carries 
greater risk for a plan. In litigation, a court reviews a plan’s decision under the highly deferential “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard of review. In external review, a qualified expert reviews the claim de novo, but only claims 
that involve the exercise of clinical or scientific judgment are eligible for external review. 
83 Punitive and extra-contractual damages are unavailable under ERISA which limits recoveries in successful 
appeals of benefit denials to the cost of the service at issue and plaintiff’s attorneys fees. 
84 See, e.g., Andrew Clark, Wal-Mart Drops Bid to Sue Brain-Damaged Former Shelf-Stacker, THE 
GUARDIAN, April 2, 2008; Tara Parker-Pope, Injured Woman Wins Wal-Mart Saga, N.Y. TIMES, April 4, 2008; 
Andrew Wolfson, Walmart Changed Policy After Claiming an Injured Worker’s Settlement Became a PR 
Nightmare, LOUISVILLE COURIER JOURNAL, April 5, 2018. 
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II. OUR PROPOSAL: AN EMPLOYER PUBLIC HEALTH 
INSURANCE OPTION 
We believe there is a better way forward than either Medicare for All or an 
individual public option. We propose a public option for employers, which would 
give employers a voluntary choice to offer Medicare-based public insurance 
coverage in lieu of traditional group coverage. We begin by making the basic case 
for an employer public option and then review key design features in detail. We 
conclude by examining the likelihood that the proposal would gain traction among 
employers and other stakeholders.  
A. The Basic Case for an Employer Public Option  
If the ultimate goal of health care reform is to move toward universal and 
equitable coverage, we believe that providing employers with the ability to offer 
employees coverage through a Medicare-based public insurance program presents a 
meaningful and politically viable opportunity for reform. Specifically, an employer 
public option offers a path toward systemic reform, as well as direct benefits for both 
employers and employees, and it sheds the primary downsides of the two most 
prominent reform proposals. Unlike Medicare for All, a public option for employers 
would not force a shift to public coverage, yet it would have far more impact than 
an individual public option. Importantly, for those that favor Medicare for All as a 
long-term strategy, an employer public option would provide a potential transition 
to that end point. And an employer public option could be offered alongside an 
individual public option without harm to either strategy. 
1. The Ability to Achieve Systemic Change 
a. Price Control and Provider Networks 
An employer public option provides a mechanism to decrease the cost of care 
and its administrative expenses, increase the number of individuals with health 
insurance coverage, and deliver subsidies to low- and moderate-income individuals.  
A key feature of an employer public option and its ability to bring about systemic 
change is the ability of the government to negotiate down prices. Medicare prices 
are on average one-half that of private health insurance plans.85 Over the past 
decade, Medicare has controlled per enrollee spending much better than private 
health insurance.86 Health spending growth has far outpaced growth of the economy, 
growing from just under seven percent of GDP in 1970 to nearly twenty percent 
now.87 Even over the last decade, from 2008-2019, during a period when the rate of 
spending has slowed, private health insurance cumulative growth in per enrollee 
 
85 Eric Lopez et al., Kaiser Family Foundation, How Much More Than Medicare Do Private Insurers Pay? A 
Review of the Literature (Apr. 15, 2020), at https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/how-much-more-than-
medicare-do-private-insurers-pay-a-review-of-the-literature/ (last accessed Feb. 15, 2020).  
86 Rabah Kamal et al., How has U.S. spending on healthcare changed over time?, PETERSON-KFF: HEALTH 
SYSTEM TRACKER (Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/u-s-spending-healthcare-
changed-time/#item-start. 
87 Id.  
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spending is over fifty percent, as compared to half that rate (just over twenty-six 
percent) for Medicare.88  
During this same period, health care providers—including hospitals and 
physicians—have merged and become increasingly consolidated.89 As a result, in 
many areas of the country providers have been able to demand higher prices for care 
with little effective resistance from private insurers and employers against these 
demands.90Even when Amazon, Berkshire Hathaway, and JPMorgan Chase joined 
together to attempt wield their collective power to improve employer-provided 
health care, they found that they lacked the market power to successfully negotiate 
prices down.91 Large insurers might in some cases be able to push back on providers 
in market-based negotiations, but insurers have also become more consolidated over 
time and lack incentive to find the edge of negotiations when they can pass price 
increases off onto employers (and eventually employees).92 Even when insurers 
push back, providers still often have the upper hand when they are critical to a local 
network, as in the case of “must-have” hospitals or large integrated networks of 
hospitals and physicians.93    
Medicare, however, preserves a large, unrestricted network of providers despite 
lower reimbursement rates. It does so in part because of its scale, which translates 
to volume benefits to providers but also makes it difficult for large providers and 
hospitals to refuse to accept Medicare patients. It also does so by paying rates that 
make Medicare reimbursement acceptable for many providers, and not just when in 
mix with privately insured patients. Efficient hospitals were able, until recently, able 
to break even based on Medicare reimbursement rates.94 
While setting reimbursement rates within an employer public option would be a 
delicate task, as we discuss in detail below, for now it is sufficient to note that a 
public option that uses Medicare’s rates and network as a starting point would be a 
viable mechanism for reducing the cost of care. In addition, a public option should 
also enjoy reduced administrative costs compared to current employer plans due to 
economies of scale and simplification. 
For employees, an employer public option thus offers the possibility of lower 
health care costs delivered by a less restricted network of providers. If cost savings 
of public over private coverage are preserved even in part, savings should in theory 
translate into wage growth and increased employment, since we know that rising 
 
88 Id.  
89 Martin Gaynor, Examining the Impact of Health Care Consolidation, Statement before the Committee on 
Energy and Commerce Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee U.S. House of Representatives 8-9 (Feb. 14, 
2018), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF02/20180214/106855/HHRG-115-IF02-Wstate-GaynorM-
20180214.pdf. (last accessed Feb. 15, 2021).  
90 Id.  
91 Sebastian Herrera & David Benoit, Why the Amazon, JPMorgan, Berkshire Venture Collapsed: ‘Health 
Care Was Too Big a Problem,’ WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2021 (“Despite Amazon, JPMorgan and Berkshire’s collective 
size, they lacked scale to garner enough negotiating power with care providers”). 
92 Gaynor, supra note 89, at 9.  
93 See, e.g., Robert A Berenson et al., Unchecked Provider Clout In California Foreshadows Challenges To 
Health Reform, 29 HEALTH AFF. 699, 702 (2010) (“‘Must-have’ hospitals, by definition, have market leverage over 
health plans, because plans cannot plausibly threaten to exclude them.”). 
94 Id.  
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health care costs have done the inverse.95 Despite economic growth, wages have 
stagnated since the 1970s and many attribute that stagnation in part to health care 
cost growth that has well exceeded inflation.96  
b. Expanded Coverage, Especially for Low-Wage Workers 
An employer public option also presents an opportunity to meaningfully expand 
coverage to the currently uninsured, through a combination of lowering prices and 
increasing the availability of subsidies. As just described, the cost of coverage 
should decrease under the public option through a combination of lower 
reimbursement rates and lowered administrative expenses, which should in turn 
increase the number of employees who elect offered coverage. In addition, an 
employer public option would provide an opportunity to expand the subsidies 
currently available to low- and moderate-income individuals who purchase coverage 
on the individual market. 
There are currently twenty-six million employees who either are not offered 
coverage by their own firms or are offered and decline coverage.97  In 2019, only 
57.9 percent of employees at large firms enrolled in employer sponsored health 
insurance.98  Roughly twenty percent of employees were ineligible for ESI because 
of waiting periods or part-time/temporary work status.99  Of those eligible for 
insurance, only seventy-six percent elected to purchase it.100  Many of those 
declining to take up ESI offers likely obtained coverage elsewhere (often under the 
health plan of another family member or through public programs like Medicaid), 
but some no doubt turned down the coverage because of the cost or other 
considerations.   
According to recent research by the Commonwealth Fund, the composition of 
uninsured Americans has shifted dramatically since 2010 so that a larger portion are 
now working uninsured.101 Back when the ACA was enacted, fifty percent of  
working-age uninsured Americans were unemployed. By 2018, as a result of the 
ACA’s expansion of coverage, only thirty-eight percent of the working-age 
 
95 Katherine Baicker and Amitabh Chandra, The Labor Market Effects of Rising Health Insurance Premiums, 
24 J. LABOR ECON. 609 (2006), at https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/505049?mobileUi=0&. 
There are no guarantees, of course, that cost savings will reach workers’ pockets, especially in industries where the 
balance of power between labor and employers has become lopsided. Eventually as Medicare covers more or most 
of the population, we would hope that workers experience an increase in wages, but these offsets are difficult to 
explain to the public and not guaranteed, which made the transition to MFA more challenging politically.  Some 
experts propose attempting to legislate the return of such savings into workers pockets, but guaranteeing they remain 
there in the long-run equilibrium would be difficult. See Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, We Can Afford 
Medicare For All, POLITICO (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.politico.com/news/agenda/2019/11/25/agenda-can-we-
afford-medicare-for-all-071560. 
96 Mark J. Warshawsky & Andrew G. Biggs, Income Inequality and Risking Health-Care Costs, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 6, 2014, at https://www.wsj.com/articles/mark-warshawsky-and-andrew-biggs-income-inequality-and-rising-
health-care-costs-1412568847?wpisrc=nl-wonkbk&wpmm=1. 
97 KFF Employer Health Benefits 2020, supra note 13, at 58. 
98 Id..  
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Munira Z. Gunja & Sarah R. Collins, Who Are the Remaining Uninsured, and Why Do They Lack 
Coverage?, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (August 2019), at 11, 
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Gunja_who_are_remaining_uninsured_sb.pdf. 
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uninsured were unemployed.  In contrast, the share of the uninsured who work full 
time has increased from thirty percent in 2010 to forty-two percent in 2018, while 
the share of those who work part-time stayed constant at nineteen percent during this 
period.  Thus, in 2018, over sixty percent of the uninsured were employed.  While 
more work needs to be done to understand exactly who are the working uninsured, 
the studies of Medicaid-eligible workers offer evidence of the labor attributes of 
low-wage workers without employer coverage. Nearly half of this population work 
at firms with more than 100 employees,102 with heavy concentrations in the service 
sector and agriculture.103   
Subsidies offered through an employer public option could improve rates of 
coverage among the low-wage working population. Under the current system, 
employees who are offered affordable and adequate coverage are ineligible for the 
premium tax credits that are available for exchange-based individual coverage. Yet, 
for many the cost of their share of employer coverage—without subsidies—is 
unaffordable. An employer public option offers an attractive mechanism for 
rationalizing current subsidy design. Our subsidy proposal, detailed in the next 
subpart, envisions providing the same subsidies to participants in an employer public 
option as those that are provided on the individual market. 
c. Addressing Churn and Portability 
An employer public option, particularly if widely adopted, could also help 
address other systemic issues, such as churn between employer-provided coverage 
and Medicaid, and the care disruptions that often occur when individuals switch 
employment or lose jobs. Rather than falling out of private insurance coverage as 
they do today, workers covered by a public option could more easily and seamlessly 
retain their health care coverage if unemployed or moving between jobs. 
For example, if an employer public option is offered alongside an individual 
public option, an individual who loses employer-provided coverage could 
seamlessly switch to individual coverage at subsidized rates, if applicable. Similarly, 
the employer public option could be a Medicaid coverage option that allows low-
income individuals to retain their employer-provided coverage even when their 
income dips to Medicaid-eligibility levels. 
2. Ability to Test Transition to a Single-Payer System 
One of the most significant benefits offered by an employer public option is the 
ability to enroll in short order large numbers of participants – significantly more than 
one primarily for individuals, particularly if large employers are targeted.104 If just 
a small number of major employers elected to participate, hundreds of thousands of 
households would transition to the public option, providing a meaningful 
 
102 ARE UNINSURED ADULTS WHO COULD GAIN MEDICAID COVERAGE WORKING?, THE KAISER COMMISSION 
ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED (Kaiser Family Foundation, Feb. 2015), available at 
http://files.kff.org/attachment/fact-sheet-are-uninsured-adults-who-could-gain-medicaid-coverage-working 
103 Id.; Jennifer Tolbert, What Issues Will Uninsured People Face with Testing and Treatment for COVID-
19?, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (March 16, 2020), https://www.kff.org/uninsured/fact-sheet/what-issues-will-
uninsured-people-face-with-testing-and-treatment-for-covid-19/. 
104 Linda J. Blumberg et al., Health Policy Center, Estimating the Impact of a Public Option or Capping 
Provider Payment Rates (Mar. 2020), at https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/2020/03/23/estimating-the-
impact-of-a-public-option-or-capping-provider-payment-rates.pdf 
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opportunity to collect data and to test the feasibility of expanding Medicare over 
time. It would also allow refinement over time in cooperation with sophisticated 
private industry partners. If several major employers make the leap and it works, it 
might persuade others that the benefits of their siloed private plans are not worth 
maintaining. 
B. Design Features of an Employer Public Option 
For an employer public option to be successful – both in terms of providing 
valuable coverage to employees and facilitating structural reform – it must be 
carefully designed.  The design details will, of course, determine whether an 
employer public option is politically feasible and also whether employers, especially 
large employers, can be enticed to give up current private coverage for a public 
alternative.   
This section explores the key design features that will be necessary to navigate 
carefully to create a plausible policy and a competitive plan. Although we do not 
intend to solve all of these details perfectly here, we mention several that we think 
are the most important and explain their significance. We also describe how we 
would approach these design choices, recognizing that many readers might have 
different preferences, but proceeding under the assumption that there is value in 
setting forth a concrete proposal. 
1. Voluntary Structure 
Critically, there would be no mandatory change in employer health care plans, 
which was a political stumbling block for Medicare for All in the Democratic 
primaries and in many previous health care reform efforts.  Participation would be 
entirely voluntary on the part of employers, and would be subject to the same labor 
market pressures and cost concerns that currently inform their health plan decision-
making. Indeed, large employers are the most sophisticated health finance decision 
makers in our current system.105  Individuals would almost certainly be more 
receptive to a public option if selected and offered by their employers than if 
imposed on them by the government.  They might still resist the initial switch, but 
that transition could be managed.    
This voluntary feature is critical for two reasons.  First, it insulates the approach 
from criticism that it infringes upon individual autonomy or market forces.  
Employers will only adopt a public option plan if they conclude that is it in their best 
interest or in the best interest of their employees to do so.  Second, a public option 
for employers structured in this way would reduce the budgetary impact of 
expanding public coverage, as compared with either Medicare for All or even 
leading public options programs focused on individuals.  Current employer and 
employee contributions to employer-sponsored health insurance could be retained—
 
105 Of course, employers do not always get it right. Some of the best research illumining how employees make 
poor choices was made possible by their employers offering what are called “dominated” health plans. These plans 
are worse in than an alternative option for all possible enrollees in all possible scenarios. No employee should 
choose such plans and no wise employer should have it on the menu of options. One of the most well-known of 
these studies was conducted at University of Michigan, which one might think would have a sophisticated HR 
department.  Sinaiko & Hirth, supra note 57. But compared to individuals navigating options, many employers, 
especially large ones, would be able to identify a public option that is better than what they offer privately. 
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in whole or in part—to finance an employer-based public option. We review the 
budgetary treatment of a public option for employers in Part III, but, for current 
purposes, it is sufficient to note that, from a fiscal perspective, a public option for 
employers has considerable advantages over other approaches.   
2. Target Market 
At least as an initial matter, we think the best policy target would be large 
employers, especially employers with more than 1000 employees. This would 
enable a smooth roll out to a meaningful number of people in a streamlined way. It 
would also allow partnering with a few large employers to test and refine the idea to 
demonstrate effectiveness and to refine policy details in the initial years of 
implementation.   
Roughly 61.2 million or 46.6% of all private sector employees in the United 
States are located in these larger firms, as are a comparable percentage of employees 
covered by employer sponsored health insurance.106 But even more important than 
gross numbers is efficiency in distribution.  There are approximately twelve 
thousand firms with more than 1000 employees in the United States, implying an 
average of roughly six thousand employees per firm.107  By way of contrast, 
according to Census data from 2017, there are nearly six million U.S. firms with 
fewer than 50 employees and more than five million of these have fewer than 20 
employees.108  
Another advantage of focusing on larger employers is that nearly all of these 
firms already offer health insurance to their employees, likely making them more 
receptive to a solution that could improve upon their status quo. Importantly, these 
firms already have the health insurance expertise to make informed decisions in this 
area, either through their own human resources staff or outside benefit consultants. 
To the extent that an employer public option offers a strong value proposition, large 
employers should be well equipped to evaluate the relevant data. 
3. Exclusivity Requirements 
Although it is possible to do otherwise, we recommend employers have to opt 
either to retain their private plan or to move all employees to the public option. 
Exclusivity would maximize equity and diminish adverse selection concerns—that 
employers would try to encourage employees with greater medical needs to choose 
the public option.109  An exclusivity requirement would also lessen the need for 
 
106 See AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., 
MEDICAL EXPENDITURE PANEL SURVEY (2019), , 
https://meps.ahrq.gov/data_stats/summ_tables/insr/national/series_1/2019/tia1.pdf.  
107 The MEPS data cited in the preceding footnotes reports on establishments rather than firms, but BLS data 
indicates that the number of large firms is on the order of the twelve thousand figure cited in the text. See U.S. 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DISTRIBUTION OF PRIVATE SECTOR FIRMS BY SIZE CLASS, 
https://www.bls.gov/web/cewbd/table_g.txt .  These figures are substantially consistent with more comprehensive 
Census Department data for 2017, which reports on both firms and establishments.  See UNITED STATES CENSUS 
BUREAU, 2017 SUSB ANNUAL DATA TABLES BY ESTABLISHMENT INDUSTRY (Mar. 2020), 
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/susb/2017-susb-annual.html. 
108 Id. 
109 Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine Health Care Reform by Dumping Sick 
Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125 (2011). 
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complexities associated with experienced-based pricing and similar safeguards.  It 
would prevent redoubling the problems with individual-level health plan decision-
making, as discussed above.   
On the other hand, many employers today offer a range of health care plan 
options and some employers – especially larger employers–-regard the ability to 
provide gold-plated health care plans as important tool in attracting top talent.  
Unions, as well, may object to a strict exclusivity requirement as reducing the 
potential scope of collective bargaining agreements.  Fewer employers may thus 
choose a public option if it is the only plan they can offer.  
In the end, we think employers should be required to adopt the public option as 
an exclusive base health care plan for all employees,110 but could offer supplemental 
policies with more extensive benefits for all or some of their workforce, including, 
for example, those covered by collective bargaining agreements. 
4. Pricing and Financing of a Public Option Plan 
The financial terms of the public option can benefit both employers and 
employees. An important question is how much of what is currently used to finance 
employer-sponsored health insurance could and should be captured to finance an 
employer-based public option. According to 2020 data, the average total annual 
premium for employer-provided health care coverage was $21,342 for family 
coverage and $7470 for single coverage.111 On average, workers picked up eighteen 
percent of the premium for single coverage and thirty percent for family coverage.  
Plan details, of course, vary considerably across employers, with larger employers 
generally offering more generous benefits than smaller employers. Current cost 
structures could serve as a pricing benchmark and something close to current 
premiums for private insurance plans could potentially be available to finance an 
employer public option.   
Although is possible to use experience-based pricing—that is, pricing adjusted 
over time by employer based on its employees’ medical care costs—doing so would 
cut squarely against coverage and equity goals.  Experience based pricing is 
consistent with current practices as most large employers (79.9%) self-insure their 
health care coverage,112 and fully-insured policies for large employers are generally 
experience rated.113  That said, if one goal is to encourage employers to adopt a 
 
110 For current purposes, we leave to the side questions as to how define the boundaries of an employer in the 
case of affiliate firms or those organized as conglomerates engaged in substantially different lines of business. 
111 KFF Employer Health Benefits 2020, supra note 13, at 6. 
112 Authors calculations from 
https://meps.ahrq.gov/data_stats/summ_tables/insr/national/series_1/2019/tia1.pdf (Table I.A.2.a). 
113 Questions of experience rating interact with those addressed just below on whether employers must move 
all employees over to a public option, or are allowed to offer other plans as well. If the latter, experience rating may 
be advisable to combat employer sorting among plan choices.  Among small employers, most only offer one plan, 
which eliminates concerns of employee sorting if that plan becomes the public option.  Only 32.9% of employers 
with fewer than 50 employees have two or more plans. Authors calculations from  
https://meps.ahrq.gov/data_stats/summ_tables/insr/national/series_1/2019/tia1.pdf (Table I.A.2.d).  On the other 
hand, a very high percentage – 88.2% -- of employers with more than 1000 employees offer two or more health care 
plans.  Id.  
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public option for lower-wage workers with more costly health care needs, 
experience-rating would undermine that goal.114 
5. Contributions from Employers & Employees 
Whatever the premiums in the public option plan, attention should also be given 
to how those costs are shared between employers and employees.  Employer 
sponsored plans currently require different levels of employee contributions.  One 
could imagine a public option for employers imposing a standard sharing 
arrangement for all participating employers (say, a 70/30 split that reflects 
something close to current practices for family coverage) or allowing employers to 
continue with whatever sharing arrangement they currently have with employees, or 
a transitional approach where employers are allowed to stay with current practices 
for some period of time, but gradually moving to a uniform approach.  
Especially to the extent that a public option reduces costs of employer sponsored 
coverage, employers might attempt to capture that savings. Accordingly, some 
safeguards could ensure that premium sharing between employers and employees 
not be altered to redistribute the cost of health care coverage.  While various 
approaches could work, one simple approach would be to require employers already 
providing ESI to maintain the current division of employer-employee contributions 
for some period of years.  Employers offering ESI for the first time could be required 
to adopt industry average contribution rates, such as a 70/30 split. This approach 
would tolerate differences in employer-employee contributions among employers at 
least through some transitional period, but would ensure that employees share in any 
costs savings on overall premium payments.115 Another approach, and the one we 
adopt for purposes of our subsidy proposal below, is to impose a fixed contribution 
percentage for all employers.  
6. Incorporating ACA Subsidies 
To maximize enrollment of low-income workers, there is potential to 
incorporate ACA subsidies into employer coverage. While adding to fiscal costs, 
this feature might contribute substantially to the number of workers covered by an 
employer public option, especially among those who currently decline enrollment in 
 
114 For employers with low-income and less-healthy workforces, experience-based pricing could 
disincentivizes selecting an employer public option.  In this context, pricing that is blind to employee health status 
could be seen as a positive rather than a negative because employees in greater need of medical care and less able 
to afford it will gain access. Cf. Deborah Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity in 
EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon 
eds., 2002) (describing how increased use of medical care with insurance might indeed be a good thing since it 
could mean that people who previously needed care but did not receive it are able to do so without insurance). It 
might give employers with a less healthy workforce more chance to operate without shouldering an excessive share 
of health care costs of American workers.  It might mean those workers get better benefits than they would 
otherwise.  And it might mean that lower-paid workers are able to get better healthcare without seeing their wages 
stagnate.  Plus, it might make sense that part of the cost of keeping higher-risk workforces healthy should be cross-
subsidized.  
115 On this dimension, we diverge from proposals that anchor public option costs for employers to current 
premium levels, and anchor instead on current allocations of premium costs. We contemplate uniform pricing of 
public option plans for employers, with potential experience adjustments.    
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ESI for financial reasons or whom employers predict would do so and thus exclude 
from coverage.116  
The ACA addressed the unaffordability of privately-financed coverage in two 
ways, through premium tax credits and cost-sharing subsidies.  Premium costs for 
individual insurance policies purchased on ACA exchanges are subsidized for 
individuals with household income between 100% and 400% of the federal poverty 
level through refundable tax credits.  These subsidies cover the difference between 
a specified percentage of household income and the cost of the “benchmark plan” 
available to the individual, on a sliding scale.117 Individuals who are offered 
employer coverage that is considered affordable and adequate by the ACA are not, 
however, eligible for these subsidies. In effect this means that people offered 
coverage through work are rarely eligible for subsidies.  
Even worse, the definition of what is “affordable” coverage under the ACA puts 
many families at a sharp disadvantage when a member of the family is offered 
coverage at work.  The ACA provides that employer coverage is “affordable” when 
an employee’s required contribution is less than 9.78% of household income,118 and 
adequate if the actuarial value of the plan is at least 60%.  Regulations, however, 
base the affordability calculation solely on the required contribution for employee-
only coverage, even if the employee desires family coverage.119 For example, 
assume an employee is married with two minor children and has household income 
of $65,500 per year. Her employer offers her health insurance where the required 
contribution for employee-only coverage is $5,000, while the contribution for family 
coverage is $10,000.  Because the contribution for employee-only coverage is equal 
to 7.6% of the employee’s household income, the ACA deems that coverage 
affordable, even though family coverage would cost 15.3% of household income. 
Because the family is deemed to have “affordable” employer coverage under this 
test, no one in the family may receive a premium tax credit on the individual market.  
If this same family had not been offered employer coverage at all, they would have 
been eligible for a tax credit that would allow them to purchase subsidized silver-
level coverage for the entire family with a household required contribution of $5,456 
annually.120 As this example known as the “family glitch” illustrates, under the 
current system, individuals can be made worse off by being offered employer-
 
116 As ineligible workers are typically lower-paid, many employers may have rationally concluded that many 
of these individuals would not wish to participate in an employer-sponsored health care plan.  But this calculation 
might change if ACA-style subsidies were available.   
117 I.R.C. § 36B. The benchmark plan is the second lowest-cost silver level plan available to the individual. Id. 
§36B(b)(3)(B). For example, an individual with household income equal to 150% of the federal poverty level would 
receive a credit equal to the difference between 4.12% of household income and the cost of the benchmark plan, 
while an individual with household income of 375% of federal poverty receives a credit equal to the difference 
between 9.78% of income and the cost of the benchmark plan See Rev. Proc. 2019-29. 
118 The statute sets affordability at 9.5% of income, subject to future annual adjustments based on growth in 
income and growth in premiums. For 2020, affordability is set at 9.78% of income. Rev. Proc. 2019-29. Note that 
this calculation does not account for the part of health care costs that the employer funds. So with a typical 70/30 
employer/employee split, affordability is measured only with respect to 30 percent employee contribution. 
119 Treas. Reg. §1.36B-2(c)(3)(v)(A)(1). 
120 This amount was calculated using an income of $65,500 for a family of four, which is equal to 250% of the 
federal poverty level for 2021, and a resulting premium tax credit equal to the difference between the cost of silver 
coverage and 8.33% of income. 
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provided coverage because it causes them to lose premium subsidies that would 
otherwise be available to them based on their income level. 
  The second ACA mechanism to address the problem of unaffordability is cost-
sharing subsidies that lower the out-of-pocket costs of receiving care once insured.  
These cost-sharing subsidies are available to individuals with household income 
between 100% and 250% of the federal poverty level, but only if they purchase 
silver-level coverage on an exchange.121  As with the premium tax credits just 
described, these subsidies are unavailable to low- and moderate-income individuals 
who are offered affordable and adequate coverage by an employer.  Because of this 
limitation on eligibility, low- and moderate-income individuals again may be made 
financially worse off by an offer of employer-provided coverage.  The cost-sharing 
subsidies require insurers to lower out-of-pocket maximums122 and increase the 
percentage of covered expenses on average paid by the insurer from the 70% 
generally required for silver-level coverage to at least 73% and in some cases as high 
as 94%.  The threshold for “adequate” employer coverage, by contrast, requires the 
plan to pay, on average, only 60% of covered expenses.  It is therefore possible that 
a low-income employee offered coverage by an employer could both pay more in 
health insurance premiums and receive much less generous coverage than would be 
available if the employer offered no coverage at all. 
An employer public option presents an attractive mechanism to help address the 
shortcomings and distortions present in these two affordability tools. Specifically, 
the public option could provide premium subsidies that are consistent with those 
offered on the individual market and could feasibly calculate and implement the 
required employee contributions.  In addition, the public option could vary cost-
sharing schedules by income.  For example, the public option might specify that 
individuals with income at or below 150% of federal poverty pay a $5 copay for an 
office visit, moderate income enrollees pay $15, and everyone else pays $25.  
Implementing income-based cost-sharing schedules on the scale of a public option 
is much more efficient than every employer trying to do so.   
While cost-sharing subsidies are relatively straight forward, premium subsidies 
are less so, and are worth a bit more discussion. There are many possible subsidy 
designs that could be implemented in conjunction with an employer public option, 
but we envision an approach that smooths subsidy design between employer and 
individually purchased coverage and allows employers a simplified method of 
satisfying the existing employer mandate.  We present here one possible approach 
with these goals in mind.  
In order to ensure that employer money stays in the system, the public option 
could specify a minimum required employer contribution percentage for all 
coverage tiers (employee-only, employee plus spouse, and family coverage, for 
 
121 These cost-sharing subsidies are complicated because they require the insurer to reduce cost sharing to 
increase the actuarial value of the plan from 70% to between 73% and 94% for the individual, depending on income. 
It is up to the insurer how to adjust deductibles, coinsurance, and copays to hit the required actuarial values for the 
various income tiers.   
122 Individual marketplace plans can have an out-of-pocket maximum no higher than $8,550 for individual 
coverage in 2021. Out-of-pocket maximums for those eligible for cost-sharing reductions can be no higher than 
$2,850 to $6,800 for an individual. Similar reductions apply to family level coverage. 
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example).123  While setting a flat employer contribution percentage of, say, 70% of 
the cost of coverage—based on the average employer share of a family plan—may 
not perfectly capture existing employer contributions, it could likely get close in the 
aggregate and has the benefit of treating all employers equally.  To prevent distortion 
between individual and employer market subsidies, we assume the same subsidy 
amount and structure would be available to employer public option participants as 
those in the individual market, with the public option calculating the available 
premium subsidies for potentially eligible participants, as the exchanges currently 
do for individually-purchased coverage.  If premium subsidies continue to be based 
on the percentage of household income a family is required to pay for health 
insurance, the public option could gather the requisite income information and 
inform the employer of the required employee contribution amounts so that each 
eligible employee’s payroll deduction reflects the subsidized cost of public option 
coverage.  If the employee’s household income is low, the federal subsidies might 
fully cover the employee’s contribution and then could be applied to subsidize part 
of the employer’s share as well, to create additional incentives for employers to 
extend coverage to their low-income employees.  As with the current individual 
market subsidies, final subsidy amounts could be reconciled when an employee files 
his or her tax return for the year.  Finally, because the current employer mandate is 
based on whether the employer offers full-time employees affordable coverage, 
employers participating in the public option could be deemed to satisfy the employer 
mandate without having to engage in any complicated calculations.124 
Addressing the current shortcomings of the ACA’s affordability tools through 
an employer public option has advantages over addressing them through either an 
individual public option or the current employer-based system.  One frequently 
proposed solution to the subsidy problem is to change eligibility provisions so that 
anyone eligible on the basis of income can purchase a subsidized marketplace plan, 
irrespective of any available employer-provided coverage.125  But that approach fails 
to capture current employer health care contributions, placing more burden on the 
government to fund the cost of coverage if someone opts for individual coverage 
and out of an employer plan.  It also places a significant burden on low-income 
individuals, who must learn of individual market subsidies, decide if they are better 
off with those subsidies and an ACA plan versus employer subsidies and an ESI 
plan, and purchase such coverage.  Harnessing the ability of employers, particularly 
large employers, to educate employees, facilitate enrollment, and subsidize coverage 
 
123 As mentioned earlier, there may be value in allowing employers currently providing employer sponsored 
insurance to transition from current cost sharing arrangements to the fixed percentages assumed in the text. For 
simplicity, the example given above assumes uniform cost-sharing arrangements.  
124 While deeming the employer mandate satisfied is a straightforward regulatory simplification where the 
employer allows all employees to elect the public option, a more nuanced approach might be warranted where only 
certain employee segments are able to participate. 
125 Vice President Biden has proposed this type of universal subsidy availability, in addition to other changes 
to subsidy amounts and income limits. Cynthia Cox et al., Kaiser Family Foundation, Affordability in the ACA 
Marketplace Under a Proposal Like Joe Biden’s Health Plan, at https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-
brief/affordability-in-the-aca-marketplace-under-a-proposal-like-joe-bidens-health-plan/ (In addition, Biden would 
allow workers with an offer of job-based coverage to enroll in Marketplace plans with subsidies if that would be a 
better deal. Under current law, employees qualify for Marketplace subsidies only if their employer’s plan is deemed 
unaffordable or does not satisfy minimum coverage requirements.)(2020). 
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offers distinct advantages over solutions that rely on individual initiative.  In 
addition, because large employers could add significant numbers of public option 
enrollees compared to an individually-focused solution, the problem of Medicaid 
churn could be much more broadly addressed. 
It is even less plausible to address the current shortcomings through existing 
employer plans.  Doing so would be difficult for a host of reasons, including the lack 
of standardization among employer plans and the need to have a sophisticated 
interface between employers and the government to advance premium tax credits.  
How would the government determine the correct level of subsidy, for example, if 
employer plans can differ fundamentally in their coverage terms and generosity?  
While income-based cost-sharing could perhaps be implemented within the current 
employer system, doing so would involve significant duplication of effort across 
thousands of plans. 
To be clear, our proposed solutions do not address the universe of distortions 
and inequities caused by the current tax treatment of health insurance and medical 
expenses.  While there are many, the best known and most expensive is the tax 
preference for employer-provided coverage, which is one of our largest tax 
expenditures, resulting in an estimated $179.2 billion of forgone revenue in fiscal 
year 2021.126 Because this subsidy takes the form of an exclusion from otherwise 
taxable income, the value of the subsidy varies with an individual’s marginal tax 
rate, with the result that those in the highest tax brackets receive the greatest benefit 
(a structure commonly referred to in the tax literature as an “upside down” subsidy).  
Although we do not propose to take on this long-standing and long-criticized tax 
benefit as part of our public option proposal, we note that rationalizing premium tax 
credits and cost-sharing subsidies between the employer and individual markets 
would at least help offset the upside-down nature of other tax benefits for employer-
provided coverage. 
7. Network and Reimbursement Rates 
A singular advantage the public option could have over existing employer plans 
is the ability to offer a broad, unrestricted provider network.127 When Americans 
espouse their allegiance to health care choice, many likely care more about their 
choice of doctor than their choice of insurance plan. Most hospitals and many 
doctors accept reimbursement from Medicare, which means that someone who has 
 
126 JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, ESTIMATE OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2020-
2024 33(2020). By comparison, the cost of current exchange-based subsidies for health insurance is estimated to be 
55.1 billion in fiscal year 2020. Id. 
127 A major political and technocratic question is whether the public option is based on traditional Medicare, 
which has an open network, or Medicare Advantage, Medicare plans operated by private insurers on behalf of 
Medicare that control costs in large part through narrow networks, like an HMO.  While basing a public option on 
Medicare Advantage would be more appealing to the insurance industry because it would guarantee them a more 
substantive role in the future of health insurance, and greater excuse for retaining profits, enrollees might be worse 
off, certainly in terms of network and in other regards as well. See Amanda Starc, Who Benefits from Medicare 
Advantage? WHARTON PUBLIC POLICY INITIATIVE 1 (2014).  See also CMA Staff, CMA Alert. CENTER FOR 
MEDICARE ADVOCACY (2017) (discussing gatekeeping requirements in MA plans for specialty care). The Unity 
Task Force has proposed an individual public option based on traditional Medicare, not Medicare Advantage, but 
the space between what is on the page in that proposal and what is feasible in Congress might prove formidable. 
Press Release, JoeBiden.com, Biden-Sanders Unity Task Force Recommendations 31 (Aug. 2020), at 
https://joebiden.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/UNITY-TASK-FORCE-RECOMMENDATIONS.pdf. 
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a public option based on Medicare—so long as provider participation is tied to 
Medicare participation—would have a broad choice of providers. Even though many 
employer plans have relatively broad networks, it is possible that as employers 
continue to work to control health care spending, more may turn to narrow networks, 
as the ACA individual plans have done. Even compared to the current baseline in 
employer plans, a shift to a public option will increase provider choice for many 
employees.  
In the short term, however, some people may lose access to a provider who 
participates in their private plan but not in Medicare. Over time, if more large 
employers selected the public option, more and more providers would be forced to 
accept it for reimbursement, but that tipping point could take time. 
One of the most complicated aspects of this proposal is how to set 
reimbursement rates to preserve and ensure a wide provider network. Although we 
do not begin to solve this aspect here, we note why we think it is feasible to move 
to a system with reimbursement based on and closer to Medicare rates than to private 
insurance rates.  As noted above, providers participate in large numbers in the 
Medicare program both because of the volume benefits and because evidence 
suggests that Medicare rates were, until recently, sufficient that efficient hospitals 
could profit based on them.128  In recent years, the rates have dipped slightly below 
break-even, but would require very little upward adjustment to enable 
profitability.129 Reimbursement rates could be marked up considerably over 
Medicare rates to ensure adequate provider participation, while still offering cost 
savings as compared to current private reimbursement rates.  
Over time, rates could be adjusted to ensure provider participation, especially 
by providers who are important to the large employer market. While a relatively 
modest transfer of employer-sponsored plan enrollment over to a public option with 
rates close to current Medicare reimbursement rates would not have a significant 
impact on hospital revenues, more substantial movements of coverage would.  With 
such revenue decreases, even if many providers could operate more efficiently and 
maintain profitability, plan design would have to account for what levels of 
decreases are manageable operationally and, perhaps more important, politically.  
Employer-based public option plans could have a formula for reimbursement 
increases over time as the market share of those plans increased.  Given existing 
inefficiencies, margins would not need to be fully equalized, but finding the right 
level of reimbursement that will maintain provider supply and trim spending will be 
one of the hardest aspects of this or any rate-based reform.   
8. Benefits and Cost Sharing 
An employer public option needs to offer benefits that are comparable to the 
average large employer plan in order to viably compete with such plans. Even if 
using Medicare as a starting point, it would have to be modified somewhat for a 
working population and could be simplified as well. If rolled out in legislation that 
also creates a public option for the individual markets, the two programs should be 
 
128 Lopez et al., supra note 85.  
129 Id.  
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aligned, both as a matter of equity and also to facilitate transitions between the two 
forms of public option when people face changing employment status.130   
A public option for employers should, at a minimum, cover the treatments and 
services typically covered by typical large employer plans.131  This was the same 
proxy used for setting essential health benefits for plans offered in the individual and 
small group markets.132 While the employer public option may need a modest 
augmentation to include treatments and services that are not now covered by 
Medicare but are by employer plans, it should largely follow Medicare Coverage 
Determinations that determine when certain treatments are covered, based on what 
is considered reasonable and necessary, so as to not unnecessarily duplicate efforts. 
Cost-sharing should be determined under the same principles. Medicare’s 
complicated cost-sharing provisions that result in many enrollees purchasing 
supplemental coverage need not serve as the guide for the employer public option in 
the same way that it would not for an individual public option (and perhaps should 
be revisited for Medicare as well in the future).  
Cost-sharing has at least two different components.  The first is the overall level 
of cost-sharing within a plan, referred to as the plan’s actuarial value.  A plan’s 
actuarial value represents the percentage of covered expenses paid by the plan for 
an average population.  Among large employer plans, almost one-quarter have 
actuarial values in excess of 90%, with an average actuarial value above 80%.133  
The second component is the cost-sharing design, which refers to how cost-
sharing requirements are allocated among particular types of care or points of 
service.  For example, will there be an annual deductible, or just co-pays and co-
insurance?  Will the copay for a specialist be higher than the copay for a general 
practitioner?  Will treatments with a higher value be subject to lower cost-sharing 
requirements than those of lower value?  Mapping these features to an employer plan 
benchmark is more difficult than overall actuarial value because there is significant 
variation among plans, and that variation is often based on plan type (e.g., an HMO 
is less likely to have an annual deductible than a PPO plan). The public option may 
present an opportunity to simplify cost-sharing based on the growing research that 
most people do not understand or act according to the complex financial incentives 
embedded in their plan structures.134 
 
130 As discussed below, this alignment is especially important for gig economy workers who repeatedly 
transition between traditional employment and self-employment. See Part II.B.10, infra. 
131 For an overview of the benefits typically offered by large employer plans, see DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 
Error! Bookmark not defined. (while it can be difficult to determine the precise contours of coverage under 
employer plans, most cover a broad range of medical services with substantial differences only in a few areas). 
132 42 U.S.C. §18022. 
133 See Jon R. Gabel et al., More Than Half of Individual Health Plans Offer Coverage that Falls Short of 
What Can be Sold Through Exchanges as of 2014, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1339, 1342 (2012) (finding 41.2% of employer 
plans had actuarial values between 80 and 89%, while 23.9% had actuarial values that exceeded 90%). 
134 See e.g., Michael Chernew et al., Are Health Care Services Shoppable? Evidence from the Consumption of 
Lower Limb MRI Scans, NBER Paper No. 24869, at 
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w24869/w24869.pdf; Mary E. Reed et al., In Consumer-
Directed Health Plans, A Majority of Patients were Unaware of Free or Low-Cost Preventive Care, 31 HEALTH 
AFF. 2641 (2012) (finding that a majority of enrollees were unaware that the deductible did not apply to certain 
high-value care, such as preventive office visits, medical tests, and screenings). 
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While mirroring the existing norms in the large employer market is likely a 
necessary condition to generate employer participation, there is also a case to be 
made for structuring the public option to be simpler than the norm, both in order to 
encourage participation and also to alleviate some of the burden employees have 
borne with recent increases in cost-sharing requirements.135 That said, it might be 
unrealistic to expect an employer public option to be as generous as some of the best 
employer plans are today, but employers could choose to fill in the gaps through 
supplemental coverage or by increasing wages. 
9. Communicating Benefits to Employees (and Employers) 
While it is important that the public option offer comparable benefits, it is just 
as important that those benefits be easily communicated to employees. Employees 
are much more likely to resist a plan change that they do not understand, and health 
plans are notoriously difficult for individuals to understand. Time and effort should 
be invested in the communications explaining the public option, and should include 
not only explanations of common coverage situations, but also a comparison to their 
current employer plan options. The ability to rely on employers as translators of the 
public option benefits is a major advantage as compared to an individual public 
option. 
10. Designing for Portability and Integrating with Medicaid 
An employer public option could be designed to address two common issues in 
the current employer-based system: coverage disruptions that result from job change 
or job loss, and churn between employer-provided coverage and Medicaid.  
Medicaid expansion, enacted by the ACA, was intended to provide universal 
coverage to families at or below 138% of the federal poverty level.136 In those states 
that have elected to participate in the Medicaid expansion, the coverage is typically 
provided at very low or no cost to participants. Because eligibility to participate is 
tied to household income, many individuals churn between Medicaid eligibility and 
employer coverage, even within a single year, as wages and hours change.  This 
churn is not only inefficient, but has been shown to result in significant care 
disruptions.137  
 
135 As health care costs have outpaced inflation over the past several decades, many employers have managed 
this increase by moving employees onto high deductible health plans where they pay a higher share of medical care 
costs. From 2005 to 2020, the share of large firms offering a high-deductible health plan increased from 8% to 67% 
and the number of enrollees in such plans increased from 3% in 2006 to 33% in 2020. KFF Employer Health Benefits 
2020, supra note 13, §8, Fig. 8.2 and 8.4. 
136 States, however, are not obligated to participate in this Medicaid expansion, and currently fourteen states 
leave this population uncovered.  This expanded Medicaid coverage under the ACA is almost entirely funded by 
the federal government with very limited out of pocket expense for beneficiaries. 
137 Many individuals with low income cycle between employer-provided coverage and Medicaid as their 
income and therefore eligibility fluctuates throughout a year, in a process commonly referred to as “churn.” One 
study estimated that as many as half of adults with income below 200% of federal poverty will move between 
Medicaid and individual market subsidies in a given year, Benjamin D. Sommer & Sara Rosenbaum, Issues in 
Health Reform: How Changes in Eligibility May Move Millions Back and Forth Between Medicaid and Insurance 
Exchanges, 30 HEALTH AFF. 228 (2011), while a more recent study found that, in states that had expanded Medicaid, 
13.7% of individuals with Medicaid coverage faced a coverage disruption over the course of a year. Anna L. 
Goldman & Benjamin D. Sommers, Among Low-Income Adults Enrolled in Medicaid, Churning Decreased After 
the Affordable Care Act, 39 HEALTH AFF. 85 (2020). In states that had not expanded Medicaid, 23.8% of Medicaid 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3787675
36 
 
An employer public option could improve continuity of coverage for low-
income workers who currently churn between Medicaid and employer-provided 
coverage by specifying that the public option qualifies as Medicaid expansion 
coverage.  If an employed individual’s projected income falls below 138% of federal 
poverty, the individual and the employer would cease contributing to the cost of 
coverage, with the Medicaid program paying the full premium for the public option 
instead, enabling continuity of coverage through the employer plan.  Reducing churn 
would dramatically reduce care disruptions for individuals who frequently change 
employment or whose income varies in an hourly job. As with premium tax credits 
and cost-sharing subsidies, addressing Medicaid churn through an employer public 
option provides a solution that private employer plans could not, because we could 
not, without further regulation, ensure that private employer plans offer the benefits 
and cost-sharing structures that would be appropriate for a Medicaid expansion 
population.  
With respect to care disruptions caused by changes in employment, the 
employer public option again provides some unique solutions. The easiest scenario 
is for an employee who leaves one employer who has selected the public option to 
another who has also done so. This would be the ideal seamless transition between 
jobs with no change in benefits or network. What is less obvious is how to manage 
continuous coverage for individuals who leave a job and remain unemployed or 
begin work in one of the increasing number of gig-economy jobs without coverage. 
Ideally, an individual public option would be implemented alongside the employer 
public option, and they would offer identical or nearly-identical coverage and 
networks. If that were the case, an individual losing coverage through the employer 
public option could shift to the individual market public option, with relevant 
subsidies, and not face any care disruptions. The ability to move from employer 
coverage to nearly identical individual coverage at subsidized rates would offer a 
substantial improvement over the current system, which often results in dramatic 
shifts in coverage and providers for affected individuals, not to mention the shear 
difficulty of navigating the relevant choices following a loss of job-based coverage.  
11. Regulatory Relief 
While employers play an important role in providing health insurance coverage 
to 154 million Americans,138 they do so at a significant cost. As detailed in Part 
I.C.2, employers must navigate complex legal requirements and make significant 
financial and health policy decisions when offering a health plan to employees. A 
public option for employers offers the possibility of greatly simplifying the 
employer experience. 
A key feature of a public option for employers should be to shift from the 
employer to the public option nearly all administrative tasks and legal 
responsibilities. In order to accomplish this simplified employer experience, ERISA 
 
recipients faced disruption. Churning is obviously inefficient, but it has also been shown to result in delayed medical 
care, lower utilization of preventive care, fewer prescription refills, and increased emergency department visits. Id. 
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should be amended to provide that employer participation in the public option does 
not create an employee benefit plan for purposes of ERISA, thereby relieving 
employers of all ERISA obligations with respect to public option participation. Once 
an employer elects to participate in the public option, its main responsibilities should 
be limited to facilitating employee enrollment, processing payroll contributions, and 
transmitting enrollment information to the public option. The public option would 
be responsible for reporting and disclosure, claims administration and appeals, and 
pursuit of reimbursement claims.  
C.  Potential Interest in an Employer Public Option 
Large employers may have the least incentive to move away from the status quo 
because—while burdensome—the coverage they provide is generous and highly 
valued by employees.  Small employers would in many ways be a more obvious 
target for public option participation, given their well-known struggles to offer 
quality coverage at a competitive cost, but even a high level of participation by small 
firms is unlikely to generate meaningful public option enrollment since nearly three-
quarters of workers are at large firms.139  That said, there is reason to believe that 
some large employers might welcome the opportunity to relinquish the burden of 
running a mini health care operation with escalating costs, if there were a good 
enough alternative.    
It is difficult to predict how employers of any size are likely to react to the 
availability of a public option, but it seems as if interest may be brewing.140 There is 
significant evidence that small employers would in theory be amenable to Medicare 
opt in, but less evidence on large employers.  One survey found that 64% of 
employers were interested in considering a simplified health plan design rather than 
the custom solutions created by many large firms, suggesting that a public option 
may appeal to those craving simplicity.141 Another survey, conducted of companies 
mostly with 1,000 or more employees, reported that 34% indicated a Medicare 
public option could be a helpful reform, even if a majority were resistant to Medicare 
for All.142  Recent polling by Data for Progress suggests a majority of likely voters 
supports an employer public option, which could influence employer receptivity.143  
 
139 AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., MEDICAL 
EXPENDITURE PANEL SURVEY (2018),  
https://www.meps.ahrq.gov/data_stats/summ_tables/insr/national/series_1/2019/tib1.pdf (reporting 96 million 
works at firms with 50 or more employees out of 131 million total workers, or about 73%) 
140 See, e.g., Susannah Luthi, Why Employers Are Flirting with the Public Option, POLITICO (Feb. 8, 2020, 
8:17 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/08/employers-health-care-public-option-112380; Phil 
Galewitz, Why Some CEOs Figure ‘Medicare for All’ is Good for Business, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (June 7, 2019), 
https://khn.org/news/a-large-employer-frames-the-medicare-for-all-debate/.  
141 JEFFREY C. MCGUINESS, AMERICAN HEALTH POLICY INSTITUTE, CHANGING ATTITUDES AMONG LARGE 
EMPLOYERS TOWARDS HEALTH CARE DELIVERY 9 (2017),  
http://www.americanhealthpolicy.org/Content/documents/resources/Employer_Attitudes_Towards_HC_Delivery.
pdf.  
142 Pulse of the Purchaser: Views on Affordability and Health Reforms, NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF HEALTHCARE 
PURCHASER COALITIONS, https://www.nationalalliancehealth.org/www/resources-new/pulse-of-the-purchaser (last 
updated Feb. 2020). 
143 ETHAN WINTER AND JACOB S. HACKER, DATA FOR PROGRESS, VOTERS SUPPORT A PUBLIC OPTION FOR 
HEALTH INSURANCE 8  (October 2020), at https://filesforprogress.org/memos/a-public-option-for-health-
insurance.pdf.  
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These polls are far from an accurate measure of demand, yet, conceptually even 
large employers might be inclined to consider a public option, especially with the 
right policy design and incentives.  Over the past several decades as health care cost 
growth has exceeded inflation and legal compliance costs have increased, managing 
a health plan has become increasingly burdensome.  Many large employers have had 
to redesign plans several times to deal with these costs increases, shuffling cost 
increases onto employees in the form of larger cost sharing, which can strain 
relationships with employees.  
As illustration of employer frustration with the status quo, some of the largest 
employers—Amazon, Berkshire Hathaway, and JPMorgan Chase—joined forces to 
create a new venture, Haven Healthcare to attempt to fundamentally restructure how 
their collective employees get healthcare. They recruited Atul Gawande, a leading 
voice on healthcare innovation to run Haven.144 Then, after a short period in this 
role, Gawande stepped back in May 2020, and the chief operating officer stepped 
down after nine months, suggesting some hurdles.145 In January 2021, the whole 
enterprise folded.146 Likewise, Walmart created Care Clinics for its employees that 
it is now rolling out to the broader public, whose impact remains to be seen.147 
Employers increasingly want better than the status quo, and most will struggle to 
invent it themselves.  
If only a few large employers were to move their employees into a public option, 
it could create a cascading effect. The top twenty largest employers in 2018, 
including Walmart, Amazon, UPS, Kroger, Home Depot, alone employed on the 
order of ten million people.148 If even just a few of them were to offer public 
coverage for employees and their dependents, the number of enrollees would add up 
quickly and would generate a strong incentive for regulators to focus attention on 
getting programmatic details right. Those early adopters could be partners to help 
monitor and refine the program in the first years. 
A public option program could be designed with incentives to encourage large 
businesses to be early adopters to counterbalance inertial effects. For example, as 
discussed in Part II, participating employers would need to contribute to financing 
the public option.  There could be lower contribution rates for employers who opt-
in during the initial years, increasing every year thereafter up to a maximum amount.  
Businesses that have not selected the public option might worry that the public 
plan with provider reimbursement closer to Medicare rates would translate into cost 
shifting onto them, where providers charge higher prices for private plans.  Evidence 
suggests that such practices are possible, at least in some regions where providers 
 
144 Atul Gawande, A Message from Our Chairman, HAVEN HEALTH CARE, https://havenhealthcare.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/TLP5-T4FR] (last visited Dec. 23, 2020). 
145 Alia Paavola, Haven Sees Exodus of Execs: 8 Things to Know, BECKER’S HOSPITAL REVIEW (August 6, 
2020), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-management-administration/haven-sees-exodus-of-execs-
8-things-to-know.html.  
146 Sebastian Herrera & Kimberly Chin, Amazon, Berkshire Hathaway, JPMorgan End Health-Care Venture 
Haven, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2021. 
147 Elise Reuter, Walmart Divulges Plans for ‘Healthcare Supercenters’, MEDCITYNEWS (Jun. 28, 2020), 
https://medcitynews.com/2020/06/walmart-divulges-plans-for-healthcare-supercenters/.  
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have outsized bargaining power and seek to recapture any lost revenue when some 
share of their patient population shifts to a lower-reimbursing public option.149 
While this might cause employer opposition initially, it might also lead to the 
ultimate success of an employer public option as increasing numbers of employers 
decide the public option offers a viable mechanism for controlling costs. 
The ACA likewise offers some reason to be circumspect about enthusiasm for 
plans to displace existing private employer coverage. As we saw with the small 
business health options program (“SHOP”) established by the ACA, rollout needs 
to be carefully managed to avoid early disasters, particularly of a technical nature.  
While SHOP held theoretical appeal – designed to offer a convenient method for 
small employers to shop for coverage and to offer a variety of coverage choices to 
employees – it fell far short in practice. Very few small employers chose to use the 
SHOP exchanges in the early years, with SHOP enrolling less than one percent of 
the small group market in 2016. 150 Today, SHOP exchanges barely exist.151 While 
many factors contributed to the general failure of SHOP, early technical problems 
and broker opposition were key elements.152 
Small employers may, based in part on the failure of SHOP, have little trust in 
federal solutions to health care.  Yet if large employers were to get on board first 
with successful results, small employers might follow. Small employers have more 
reason than large employers to want to outsource health benefits and have more 
explicitly voiced their preference to do so through a public option.153 Perhaps the 
key takeaway is that any employer public option—regardless of where it is offered—
must roll out smoothly and strategically to overcome inertia and other barriers.  
We also know from previous health care reform efforts that the support or 
opposition of insurers can be critical.154  Efforts to create a public option in 
 
149 See James Robinson, Hospitals Respond to Medicare Payment Shortfalls by Both Shifting Costs and Cutting 
Them, Based on Market Concentration, 30 HEALTH AFF. 1265 (2011). 
150 GAO, PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE: ENROLLMENT REMAINS CONCENTRATED AMONG FEW ISSUERS, 
INCLUDING IN EXCHANGES 30 (Mar. 2019). 
151 In 2017, CMS announced that effective January 1, 2018, the federal government would no longer handle 
SHOP functions for states that chose not to operate their own SHOP exchanges. SHOP Marketplace Enrollment as 
of January 2017, CMS (May 15, 2017), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Data-
Resources/Downloads/SHOP-Marketplace-Enrollment-Data.pdf; Timothy Jost, CMS Announces Plans to 
Effectively End the SHOP Exchange, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (May 15, 2017), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170515.060112/full/. As of 2020, only ten states and the District 
of Columbia maintain any type of SHOP platform. Id. 
152 RHETT BUTTLE ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, SMALL-BUSINESS OWNERS’ VIEWS ON HEALTH 
COVERAGE AND COSTS 4 (2019) (69% reporting they rely on a broker to choose a health plan), 
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/Buttle_small_business_owners_survey_ib.pdf. 
Marshall Allen, Insurers Hand Out Cash and Gifts to Sway Brokers Who Sell Employer Health Plans, NPR (Feb. 
20, 2019, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/02/20/694719998/insurers-hand-out-cash-
and-gifts-to-sway-brokers-who-sell-employer-health-plans. 
153 See, e.g., Press Release, Hunter Railey, Colorado Director for Small Business Majority, New Report on 
Public Option Opens the Door for More Healthcare Choices for Colorado Small Businesses (Nov. 15, 2019), 
https://smallbusinessmajority.org/press-release/new-report-public-option-opens-door-more-healthcare-choices-
colorado-small-businesses (small business majority in Colorado voicing support for public option based on 
Medicare) 
154 Shefali Luthra, Insurers Sank Connecticut’s ‘Public Option.’ Would a National Version Survive?, KAISER 
HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 4, 2020), https://khn.org/news/connecticut-public-option-battle-insurers-pushback-federal-
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Connecticut were defeated in part because of opposition by Cigna and Aetna, two 
of the state’s top employers and the state’s largest insurance companies.155  Yet, if a 
federal public option focused on the largest employers, insurance opposition might 
be reduced. Most of the largest employers self-insure,156 which reduces the role for 
insurance companies to that of a third-party administrator.  While insurers are paid 
a per capita monthly fee for such administrative work, it is likely a less profitable 
sector than insurance, which allows the insurer to keep at least a certain percentage 
of “experience gains.”157  Because a public option targeted to large employers is less 
threatening to an insurer’s profit centers, it is possible that their opposition will be 
lower.  Of course, to the extent that a public option involves an explicit role for 
private insurers as third-party administrators, resistance might be lower still. That 
said, it would be naïve to expect insurers to embrace an idea that would eventually 
erode much of their business and profits.  
There are also, however, reasons to be optimistic.  Some large employers may 
support the idea and get behind it politically. Labor unions may support an 
employer-based public option at greater levels than Medicare for All.  During the 
leadup to the ACA, major labor unions publicly supported the inclusion of an 
individual public option.158  With respect to Medicare for All, some unions support 
it on the basis that it would allow unions to focus more intently on other bargaining 
issues such as wages, while other unions oppose it because they do not want to give 
up their bargained-for health benefits.159  In part, the opposition is based on the fact 
that some union plans are more generous than Medicare.160    
President Biden explicitly promised during his campaign that, “If you have a 
generous union-backed plan and you have given up union wages to get that plan, 
you can keep it.”161 A key advantage of a public option for employers is that it allows 
union plans to stay in place.  Indeed, if health benefits are subject to a collective 
bargaining agreement they would remain unchanged under this proposal.  The 
decision of an employer to offer the public option to union employees would be 
subject to future bargaining upon expiration of the current labor agreement, and 
 
155 Id. 
156 KFF Health Benefits 2020, supra note 13, at 161. Ninety-two percent of firms with 1000 or more workers 
self-insure. Id. at 162, Fig. 10.2. 
157 While there is almost no publicly available information on the relative profitability of insured lines of 
business compared to administrative-only contracts, basic economic principles would suggest that insurers could 
charge a risk premium for taking on the uncertainty of medical expenses in a fully insured arrangement. Some 
support for this position can be seen in health insurers’ security filings. See, e.g., CVS Health Corp. Annual Report 
(Form 10-K) 31 (Feb. 18, 2020) (“Our Insured Health Care Benefits products that involve greater potential risk 
generally tend to be more profitable than our [administrative services contract] products”). 
158 Helen A. Halpin & Peter Harbage, The Origins and Demise of the Public Option, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1117 
(2010). 
159 Ian Kellgreen & Alice Miranda Ollstein, Labor's Civil War Over 'Medicare for All' Threatens its 2020 
Clout, POLITICO, Feb. 18, 2020; Amanda Becker, Democrats’ Medicare for All Must Consider Union-won Plans: 
AFL-CIO, REUTERS (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-healthcare/democrats-
medicare-for-all-plans-must-consider-union-negotiated-health-plans-afl-cio-chief-idUSKCN1VJ268; Matt Pearce, 
Candidates’ Talk of ‘Medicare for All’ Makes Some Unions Nervous. Here’s Why, LA TIMES (Dec. 23, 2019), 
https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2019-12-23/why-some-unions-are-nervous-about-medicare-for-all.  
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could easily accommodate differing union preferences in a way that Medicare for 
All could not.  This flexibility may allow greater union support for a public option 
for employers than is possible for other reform proposals under serious 
consideration. 
III. FISCAL IMPLICATIONS: SCORING AN EMPLOYER PUBLIC 
OPTION 
We turn now to the fiscal implications of an employer public option. From this 
perspective, the employer public option has a much smaller footprint that MFA, 
while still catalyzing structural improvement to healthcare financing.  We start with 
a short primer on the basic principles of federal budgeting for exchange transactions 
as opposed to direct government spending.  We next show how those principles have 
been applied to the scoring of Medicare for All proposals as well as some of the 
more prominent public options.  We then describe how an employer public option 
would likely be scored, contrasting that approach with other leading health reform 
plans.  Finally, we conclude by examining the likelihood that an employer public 
option could be established through budget reconciliation. 
 A Short Primer on Federal Budgeting for Exchange Transactions 
Our current system for accounting for the federal budget was set forth by the 
President’s Commission on Budget Concepts in 1967.162  One of the controversial 
budgetary issues of the day was how the federal budget should account for the many 
instances in which governmental entities interacted with the general public through 
market-like transactions, ranging from concession stands at the Smithsonian 
Museum to operations at national parks where visitors paid an entrance fee to the 
many different areas, from flood insurance to land leasing programs, where 
members of the public chose to make payments to government entities in exchange 
for goods or services.  Since all involved payment to a government entity, would all 
of those receipts be considered comparable to federal taxes and therefore included 
in government revenues for purposes of budgetary aggregates or should receipts of 
this sort be treated differently for the purposes of the federal budget?  To address 
these questions, the Commission’s report included a chapter on “Offsetting Receipts 
Against Expenditures” and specified: 
“For purposes of summary budget totals, receipts from activities 
which are essentially governmental in character, involving regulation 
or compulsion, should be reported as receipts. But receipts associated 
with activities which are operated as business-type enterprises, or 
which are market-oriented in character, should be included as offsets 
to expenditures to which they relate.”163 
As the report explained, when dealing with “enterprise-type” government 
activities, net costs to the government – that is expenditures less offsetting receipts 
 
162 See M. Rodgers & D. Sullivan, H.L.S., Reconsidering the President’s Commission on Budget Concepts of 
1967: Budget Policy Briefing Paper No. 30 (May 10, 2006), 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/President_Commission_30.pdf.  
163 See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON BUDGET CONCEPTS 65 (Oct. 1967).  
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– is the relevant measure of public support and thus inclusion in budgetary 
aggregates.  And as long as the underlying transactions were voluntary in nature and 
subject to market discipline, incorporating gross revenues and receipts into 
budgetary aggregates would give “an exaggerated view of the Government’s role in 
the economy.”164  In recognition that the overall size of the operation of government 
enterprises remains a topic of public interest, the Commission proposed that the 
appropriate approach was to include supplemental information on total revenues and 
expenditures in supporting budgetary documents, but to include only net 
expenditures into budgetary aggregates, such as total government revenues and 
spending. 
 The approach laid out in 1967 remains the practice today.  In the Analytical 
Perspectives section of Office and Management and Budget’s most recent budget 
documents, the budget office invoked the work of the President’s Commission and 
offered a similar justification for this aspect of budgetary practice: 
Most of the funds collected through offsetting collections and offsetting receipts 
from the public arise from business-like transactions with the public. Unlike 
governmental receipts, which are derived from the Government’s exercise of its 
sovereign power, these offsetting collections and offsetting receipts arise primarily 
from voluntary payments from the public for goods or services provided by the 
Government. They are classified as offsets to outlays for the cost of producing the 
goods or services for sale, rather than as governmental receipts. These activities 
include the sale of postage stamps, land, timber, and electricity; charging fees for 
services provided to the public (e.g., admission to national parks); and collecting 
premiums for health care benefits (e.g., Medicare Parts B and D). As described 
above, treating offsetting collections and offsetting receipts as offsets to outlays 
ensures the budgetary totals represent governmental rather than market activity.165  
As this excerpt helpfully notes, premiums for Medicare programs are one 
enumerated example of offsets in the current federal budget, as are comparable 
charges for federal flood insurance and a host of other market based transactions 
with government entities.166  Although these premiums reflect private payments to 
government entities, they are not counted as government revenues or taxes in 
budgetary aggregates.167 This approach accurately makes these programs look less 
 
164 Id. at 64. 
165 OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, Chapter 12: Offsetting Collections and Offsetting Receipts, in 
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 141 (2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2020/02/ap_12_offsetting_fy21.pdf (emphasis added).  
166 Reliance on voluntarily paid premiums to cover a good portion of for what become Medicare Part B along 
with its budgetary implications was a crucial step in the passage of the original Medicare legislation back in 1965.  
See THEODORE R. MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE, 2d (1973); Julian E. Zelizer, How Medicare Was Made, 
THE NEW YORKER (Feb. 15, 2015).  See generally Eric M. Patashnik & Julian E. Zelizer, Paying for Medicare: 
Benefits, Budgets, and Wilbur Mills’s Policy Legacy, 26 J. HEALTH POLITICS, POLICY & LAW 7 (2001). 
167  One additional refinement with respect to offsetting payments is their relationship to the law of 
appropriations.  Here, there are two basic approaches: offsetting collections and offsetting receipts, and the 
distinction is important in terms of whether the payment generates “budget authority” on the part of the receiving 
entity.  The difference is explained in the following excerpt from the GAO’s Principles of Appropriations: 
[W]e discuss two types of collections that may be received by the government: offsetting collections and 
offsetting receipts. Offsetting collections are collections authorized by law to be credited to appropriation or fund 
expenditure accounts. Generally, offsetting collections are collections resulting from business-type or market-
oriented activities, such as the sale of goods or services to the public, and intragovernmental transactions. For 
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expensive as a fiscal matter: were the CBO to score a public option for employers 
for purposes of estimating its impact on the federal deficit or spending aggregates, 
employer contributions and the costs they cover would not be included, making 
legislative passage far more likely. 
 An Overview of Scoring Estimates for Medicare for All & 
Prominent Public Option Plans 
Public debates over the cost of MFA as well as prominent public option plans 
illustrate how these scoring conventions play out in practice and were detrimental to 
MFA proposals. Table One below reproduces a chart from a recent Committee for 
Responsible Federal Budget paper titled “Primary Care: Estimating Democratic 
Candidates’ Health Plans (Feb. 26, 2020).  The table focuses on the central estimates 
for four different plans: Vice President Biden’s and Mayor Peter Buttigieg’s public 
option plans and then two MFA plans, Senator Sanders’s and Senator Warren’s. The 
chart breaks down effects into four components: increased federal costs for 
expanded and improved coverage, assumed savings from programmatic changes, 
direct offsets (from tax feedback effects and direct taxes), and indirect offsets from 
tax and spending adjustments in other areas.  It presents the ten year fiscal impacts 
of the four proposals. 
 
example, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to collect recreation fees from visitors to national parks. These 
fees are available for expenditure without further appropriation by Congress. 16 U.S.C. § 6806. 
Laws authorizing offsetting collections make them available for obligation to meet the account’s 
purpose without further congressional action. Accordingly, because the receiving agency has the authority to 
obligate and expend offsetting collections, offsetting collections constitute budget authority.4 Furthermore, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter, an appropriation is authority to incur obligations and to make payments from the 
Treasury for specified purposes. Thus, offsetting collections are an appropriation and are subject to the fiscal laws 
governing appropriated funds. B-230110, Apr. 11, 1988; 63 Comp. Gen. 285 (1984). 
In contrast, offsetting receipts are collections that cannot be obligated and expended without further 
congressional action. Offsetting receipts are not available to an agency unless Congress appropriates them.5 
Offsetting receipts are not available to the receiving agency for obligation; accordingly, offsetting receipts do not 
constitute budget authority. An example of offsetting receipts is the motor vehicle and engine compliance program 
fee collected by EPA. These fees are deposited into the Environmental Services Special Fund but are not available 
to EPA without further appropriation. 42 U.S.C. § 7552. 
See GAO OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, PRINCIPLES OF APPROPRIATIONS, ch. 2, at 2-6 (4th ed. 2016) 
(GA0-16-464SP).  While the classification of offsets as either collections or receipts is a matter that would 
ordinarily be specified in enabling legislation, the more common practice for insurance premiums would be to 
denominate such payments as offsetting collections, that is, as creating budget authority.  That is our assumption 
for purposes of this White Paper.  
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Table One: Central Estimates of the Ten-Year Fiscal Impact of Candidates’ Health 
Proposals 
 
Table One illustrates the different fiscal presentations of the two different kinds 
of health care reform. Due to their mandatory nature, the Sanders and Warren 
proposals reflect substantial new revenues in the form of employer and worker 
contributions along with substantial additional tax increases, generating between 
$15 and over $20 trillion in new revenues over the ten-year window (but still adding 
substantially to the federal deficit).  The Biden and Buttigieg plans have a much 
smaller fiscal footprint and not just because they are less ambitious programs.  The 
scoring for neither of these proposals includes direct offsets for premium payments 
that individuals would pay toward premiums for the public option, consistent with 
the treatment described above of offsetting collections in market-based transactions 
government entities.  To be sure, both the Biden and Buttigieg plans entail additional 
federal expenditures to expand coverage (reflecting subsidies and tax credits), but 
they do not reflect the entire cost of health care coverage for individuals who choose 
to participate in the public option on a voluntary basis.  While these differences may 
sound technical in nature, the very large amount of new taxes required to finance the 
Sanders and Warren MFA proposals proved to be a significant impediment in public 
debates over the course of the democratic primaries and are likely to continue to act 
as serious impediments to passage of such proposals.  
 Designing a Public Option for Employers with Budget Scoring in 
Mind 
So with this background in mind, how should an employer public option be 
designed to capture current employer and employee contributions as offsets to 
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expenditures, which would produce a budgetary impact that accurately reflects the 
net costs to the federal government?  First and foremost, the public option program 
should be voluntary in nature and designed to compete with private employer plans, 
as discussed above.  Contributions should be made directly to the public option plan, 
from both employers and employees, as is currently the case with private health 
insurance plans.  Structuring these payments as voluntary premiums instead of as 
new taxes on employers who opt into the public option and on their employees is 
critical.  For budgetary purposes, taxes would likely be mandatory and considered 
government revenues rather than offsetting collections and therefore included into 
budgetary aggregates.168 
 The precise budgetary impact of a public option for employers will depend on 
numerous design choices discussed in detail in Part II: reimbursement rates for 
medical care, whether contributions for an employer include experience adjustments 
to reflect the health characteristics of its employees, the quality of the benefits 
provided as well as out-of-pocket charges, and the amount and design of any 
subsidies.169   
Following other public option proposals that have focused on employer 
participation, we assume upward adjustment in hospital reimbursements rates above 
current Medicare rates may be necessary.  These adjustments would make a public 
option for employers more palatable for many key constituencies (like hospitals and 
other providers) but it should not generate the need for additional public 
expenditures as premiums for current ESI plans support reimbursements at even 
higher levels.  While these upward adjustments would somewhat reduce savings for 
employers and employees, our assumption is that the overall efficiencies of the 
public option will still generate residual cost savings.  
 To the extent that public option plans retain some degree of out-of-pocket 
expense for workers and dependents, flexible spending accounts offered under an 
employer’s cafeteria plan could continue to be used to allow for the payment of these 
out-of-pocket expenses with pre-tax dollars.170 To the extent that a public option for 
employers altered the extent of out-of-pocket expenditures for participating 
employees, this aspect of a public plan would also have a fiscal impact, either 
positive or negative. 
 
168  Several public option proposals that envision mandatory employer payments to cover employees who opt 
out of employer ESI and into a public option offered through an ACA exchange would also run the risk of being 
denominated government revenues as opposed to offsetting collections.   
169 Another potentially important consideration is the extent to which a public option for employers might have 
an impact on the number of Medicare eligible employees choose to stay on their employer-sponsored plans.  
Movement of significant numbers of elderly away from Medicare could reduce revenues for that program, but 
replacing it with, most likely, greater revenues for the public option, as combined employer and employee 
contributions to the public option would likely be greater than Medicare premiums. But the effects would need to 
be considered in a comprehensive scoring exercise.  
170 If the public option made high-deductible coverage available, health savings accounts could be used to pay 
out-of-pocket expenses.  A separate question might arise if employees participating in an employer-based public 
option were to purchase Medigap-style supplement plans.  The need for such plans would depend on the features of 
the public option. Medigap premiums cannot generally be paid with pretax dollars. You can deduct them, but only 
to the extent they, along with any other medical expenses, exceed ten percent of annual income. See I.R.C. §213 
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It is beyond the scope of this Article to offer a complete assessment of the 
budgetary impact of the system of subsidies outlined in Part II.  Clearly there would 
be a direct budgetary impact as the federal government would be expanding the 
scope of ACA subsidies beyond policies purchased on Exchanges.  In addition, the 
availability of these subsidies as well as the integration of Medicaid coverage into 
employer-sponsored plans would reduce the costs of employer-provided insurance 
(especially for lower income workers) and therefore likely increase the amount of 
employer-sponsored coverage for those workers – a key benefit of our proposal, but 
also an effect that would increase the level of tax expenditures for employer 
sponsored health insurance.  Furthermore, the approach we describe would likely 
expand the number of individuals receiving Medicaid benefits (albeit primarily those 
already eligible for those benefits but currently lacking the wherewithal to claim 
their entitlements.)   Finally, in calculating the overall cost of the program, CBO 
scorekeepers would need to assess the extent to which Medicaid costs for lower-
income workers would be offset by reductions in ACA-style subsidies otherwise 
directed to employer-provided plans. 
 Using Reconciliation to Enact an Employer Public Option 
While this Article is primarily focused on sketching out a new approach to health 
care reform, questions understandably may arise in some readers’ minds as to the 
political viability of our proposal, especially given the closely divided composition 
of the current U.S. Senate.  That concern necessarily poses the question whether 
legislation implementing a public option for employers – or even a simple public 
option for individuals – could be structured to comply with budget reconciliation 
procedures and hence avoid the Senate’s current filibuster requirements.  In truth, a 
definitive answer to this question would ultimately come from the Senate 
Parliamentarian, but we believe there are solid grounds to believe that a public 
option for employers could be structured to be eligible for inclusion in a 
reconciliation bill. 
 The chief impediment to inclusion of legislation in reconciliation bills is the 
Byrd Rule.171    A number of the Byrd Rule’s limitations are inapplicable, such as 
the prohibition on changes in social security, or relatively easy to meet through 
advanced planning, such as the requirement that the legislation not fall outside of 
the jurisdiction of the submitting committee or does not match the specifications of 
the authorizing budget resolution.  In addition, the budgetary effects of the public 
option would need to be anticipated in the budget resolution issuing reconciliation 
instructions. There are, however, several elements of the Byrd Rule that could 
present challenges. 
 First is the Byrd Rule’s prohibition on provisions in a reconciliation bill that do 
not “produce a change in outlays or revenue, including changes in outlays and 
revenues brought about by changes in the terms and conditions under which outlays 
are made or revenues are required to be collected.”172  To meet this requirement, the 
 
171 See Congressional Research Services, The Budget Reconciliation Process: The Senate’s “Byrd Rule” (Dec. 
1, 2020). 
172 See Section 313(b)(1)(A) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, as amended. 
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public option for employers would need to be crafted, in the first instance, as an 
expansion of the traditional Medicare program to cover a new group of participants 
on terms that would be competitive in the employer sponsored market.  A provision 
of this sort would fairly clearly increase federal outlays.  As a second step, the 
legislation could authorize the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (or some 
other governmental entity) to establish a premium schedule for employer and 
employee contributions to cover the costs of the public option.  As discussed 
elsewhere, these fees would not be denominated revenues in budgetary aggregates, 
but they would reduce federal outlays as they would offset the costs of the programs.  
Again, this approach would seem to meet the Byrd Rule’s requirements of directly 
affecting (that is, decreasing) federal spending.  Finally, to the extent that ACA 
subsidies or some variant thereon were included in a public option, that expansion 
would also seem to fall squarely within the permissible limits of reconciliation bills 
as it directly increases in federal spending in the same manner as the creation of a 
new tax expenditures.   
    To be sure, drafters would need to be careful not to include in any 
reconciliation bill additional provisions with budgetary effects that are “merely 
incidental to non-budgetary components.”173  For this reason, there could be 
advantages of hewing as closely as possible to the existing Medicare program with 
delegated rulemaking authority to CMS to adopt programmatic adjustments, along 
the lines discussed elsewhere in this article, in order to make the public option a 
viable alternative to employer sponsored health insurance.   Many reconciliation 
bills in the past – including both the Affordable Care Act and Trump era tax reform 
legislation -- have included such delegated authority and the purpose of such 
delegation would be to fix “the terms and conditions under which outlays are made,” 
that would seem to protect them from challenges that they were merely incidental to 
budgetary effects.  In a similar vein, CMS should also be authorized to determine 
the extent to which employers adopting a public option would be relieved of 
regulatory burdens under other federal provisions, such as ERISA, again justified 
against Byrd Rule attack on the grounds that it determines the terms and conditions 
under which outlays are made, as the terms of the public option for employers would 
be different (and quite likely infeasible) were the programs subject to conflicting 
federal statutory requirements. 
 A final issue under the Byrd Rule would be whether the public option for 
employers increased the projected federal deficit beyond the current budget window, 
presumably but not necessarily ten years.174 The application of this requirement 
would ultimately turn on scoring decisions by the Congressional Budget Office.   
While it is conceivable that labor market effects of this public option would increase 
employment growth and tax revenues beyond ten years and have other positive 
budgetary effects related to increase competition in the private sector, one should 
probably assume that over the ten year window the public option would increase the 
projected deficit, particularly if ACA style subsidies were included. To address this 
 
173 Id. Section 313(b)(1)(D). 
174 Here the relevant subsection of the Byrd Rule reads: “a provision shall be considered to be extraneous if it 
increases, or would increase, net outlays, or if it decreases, or would decrease, revenues during a fiscal year after 
the fiscal years covered by such reconciliation bill or reconciliation resolution. ” Id. Section 313(b)(1)(E). 
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issues, proponents could explore pay-for options that would be expected to offset 
outlays in the outyears, either related to health care reform or otherwise. An 
alternative response would be to include a sunset provision – as has often been done 
with tax legislation passed through reconciliation – in the final year of the budget 
window.  While arguably diminishing the attractiveness of the program for 
employers contemplating adoption, a sunset in this case might actually be justified 
here to the extent that one regards the public option for employers as experimental 
measure, which over the coming decade will either prove itself to be a productive 
step forward or not.  But this final element of the Byrd Rule is one which would 
need to be addressed in order to survive points of order in the Senate. 
CONCLUSION 
 
While recent health reform discussions have centered around Medicare for All 
and an individual public option, we have proposed in this Article a novel employer 
public option that addresses the shortcoming of such proposals. Medicare for All 
moves all Americans onto a publicly-financed system which, while effective in 
addressing many of the shortcomings of the U.S. system, does so in a highly 
disruptive way that is likely to face strong political opposition. On the other hand, 
the more politically-palatable individual public option may help improve coverage 
at the margins, but is unlikely to significantly reform the U.S. health care system. 
Our proposal attempts to find a middle ground, by allowing employers to lead the 
movement toward public coverage to the extent they find doing so to be in their 
interests. Creating a voluntary mechanism lead by sophisticated decisionmakers 
should not only help lessen political opposition, but will also improve budget scoring 
and fiscal impact. Most importantly, it has the ability to begin to meaningfully 
address some of  the most pressing health policy issues in the United States and can 
serve as a genuine test of the viability of a broader system of public coverage. 
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